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INTRODUCTION 
THE SEARCH FOR AN EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT 
Jeremy K. Kessler * & David E. Pozen ** 
Over the past decade, the Roberts Court has handed down a series 
of rulings that demonstrate the degree to which the First Amendment 
can be used to thwart economic and social welfare regulation—
generating widespread accusations that the Court has created a “new 
Lochner.” This introduction to the Columbia Law Review’s 
Symposium on Free Expression in an Age of Inequality takes up three 
questions raised by these developments: Why has First Amendment law 
become such a prominent site for struggles over socioeconomic inequal-
ity? Does the First Amendment tradition contain egalitarian elements 
that could be recovered? And what might a more egalitarian First 
Amendment look like today? 
After describing the phenomenon of First Amendment Lochnerism, 
we trace its origins to the collapse of the early twentieth-century “pro-
gressive” model of civil libertarianism, which offered a relatively statist, 
collectivist, and labor-oriented vision of civil liberties law. The recent 
eruption of First Amendment Lochnerism is also bound up with 
transformations in the economic and regulatory environment associated 
with the advent of “informational capitalism” and the “information 
state.” First Amendment Lochnerism may reflect contemporary judicial 
politics, but it has deep roots. 
To figure out how to respond to the egalitarian anxieties besetting 
the First Amendment, it is natural to consult normative theories of free 
speech. Yet on account of their depoliticization and abstraction, the 
canonical theories prove indeterminate when confronted by these anxie-
ties. Instead, it is a series of midlevel conceptual and jurisprudential 
moves that most often do the work of resisting First Amendment 
Lochnerism. This grammar of free speech egalitarianism, we suggest, 
                                                                                                                           
 *.  Associate Professor of Law and Milton Handler Fellow, Columbia Law School. 
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enables the creative elaboration of a few basic motifs concerning the 
scope and severity of judicial enforcement, the identification and recon-
ciliation of competing speech interests, and the quality and accessibility 
of the overall expressive system. If First Amendment Lochnerism is to be 
countered in any concerted fashion, the roadmap for reform will be 
found within this grammar; where it gives out, a new language may 
become necessary. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE EGALITARIAN ANXIETY 
The specter of inequality haunts the American legal imagination. For 
an ideologically diverse range of scholars, policymakers, and activists, 
growing inequality names both the deep cause and the dangerous effect of a 
set of overlapping conflicts—economic, racial, cultural, constitutional—that 
threaten the stability of contemporary U.S. society. Of course, the problem of 
inequality is nothing new. The nation’s constitutive ideals of economic 
independence and democratic self-rule have long achieved realization 
through practices of mastery: in particular, through the power wielded by 
white male property owners over the nonwhite, the nonmale, and the poor.1 
Given the role that material disparities have played in American 
political development, it is no surprise that the legal meaning of equality 
has proved especially contentious, or that this meaning has changed 
dramatically over time. Likewise, the relative priority of equality within 
the inventory of American constitutional values has tended to ebb and 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See generally Laura Edwards, The People and Their Peace: Legal Culture and the 
Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (2009); Aziz Rana, The Two 
Faces of American Freedom (2010). 
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flow. In the 1860s and 1960s, for instance, the dominance of equality talk 
heralded the collapse of preexisting racial and (in the 1960s) sexual 
settlements, as well as the transformation of federalism, the separation of 
powers, and a host of individual constitutional rights. Today, equality talk 
is once again at the center of the legal conversation, challenging founda-
tional assumptions about how numerous fields of law are organized and 
studied and about the social functions they are meant to serve. Why? 
One proximate cause is the financial crisis of 2008 and the economic 
disruption that followed in its wake. Congress’s and the executive 
branch’s “seemingly plutocratic response to the crisis” inspired “angry 
attacks by protesters on both left and right,”2 from Occupy Wall Street to 
the Tea Party. The Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC,3 striking down statutory limits on corporate electioneering, com-
pounded these concerns. By 2014, Americans had become alarmed 
enough to make a bestseller of economist Thomas Piketty’s 700-page 
empirical study of capitalism and inequality, Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century.4 Two years later, the antiplutocratic politics of the early 2010s 
found a still broader outlet in the 2016 presidential election. For a 
decade now, the “anxiety that the ‘Great Recession’ . . . defines a new 
economic normal,”5 in which the wealthiest individuals take an ever 
larger piece of an ever shrinking pie, has shaped American public culture. 
The conditions and aftermath of President Donald Trump’s 
ascendancy make clear that the resurgence of antiplutocratic politics was 
about far more than elite mismanagement of the macroeconomy.6 On 
the campaign trail, Trump framed his critique of postcrisis financial 
regulation as part of a larger and darker narrative of Wall Street capture  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 2. David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 626 (2014) 
[hereinafter Grewal, Laws of Capitalism]. 
 3. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). We discuss Citizens United infra section III.B. 
 4. Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 
2014); see also David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 
Theoretical Inquiries L. 61, 61 (2017) [hereinafter Grewal & Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered] 
(“Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century . . . at once produced and symbolized 
a new public awareness of economic inequality.”). 
 5. Grewal, Laws of Capitalism, supra note 2, at 626. 
 6. For a well-sourced, if contested, history of the financial crisis’s management by 
U.S. officials, see generally Ron Suskind, Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and 
the Education of a President (2011). For a more comprehensive analysis of the relation-
ship between U.S. politics and international political economy during the crisis years, see 
generally Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World 
(2018). 
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and American decline.7 “Pikettymania”8 revolved around the stark neo-
Marxist claim that “capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and 
unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic 
values on which democratic societies are based.”9 And from Black Lives 
Matter to No More Deaths to #MeToo to Medicare for All to transgender 
liberation to the Fight for Fifteen to the Dreamers to the Campaign to 
End the New Jim Crow, a wave of social movements have mobilized to 
reveal and redress the myriad structures of oppression confronting 
particular groups. It is out of this decade of struggle that what we call the 
“egalitarian anxiety” has emerged. This anxiety joins the unexpected 
traumas of national economic failure and widening economic insecurity 
to the all-too-predictable persistence of racial, ethnic, and gender 
subordination. 
New evidence on the extent of American inequality comes out 
constantly. In 1978, the wealthiest 0.1% of American households held 7% 
of the nation’s wealth.10 By 2012, that number had more than tripled.11 
Today, the richest 160,000 or so families in the United States possess as 
much wealth as the 144 million poorest families combined.12 Between the 
top 0.1% and the bottom 90%, there stands what the Atlantic recently 
dubbed “The New American Aristocracy”: “a well-behaved, flannel-suited 
crowd of lawyers, doctors, dentists, mid-level investment bankers, M.B.A.s 
with opaque job titles, and assorted other professionals.”13 These aristocrats-
by-degree account for the majority of American wealth, more than the 
top 0.1% and the bottom 90% put together.14 And while the institutions 
and communities that rear the new aristocracy often define themselves in 
terms of merit and cultural pluralism, the class they are reproducing is in 
fact a bastion of white power. “African Americans represent 1.9 percent of 
the top 10th of households in wealth; Hispanics, 2.4 percent; and all other 
minorities, including Asian and multiracial individuals, 8.8 percent—even 
                                                                                                                           
 7. See Rebecca Berg, Trump’s Wall Street Picks Clash with Populist Campaign, 
RealClearPolitics (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/12/01/trumps_ 
wall_street_picks_clash_with_populist_campaign_132473.html [https://perma.cc/FFF8-7C97]; 
Adam Thorp, As Warren Says, Trump Is No Fan of Post-Crisis Wall Street Regulations, PolitiFact 
(July 5, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/jul/05/elizabeth-
warren/warren-says-trump-no-fan-post-crisis-wall-street-r [https://perma.cc/A594-SKEG]. 
 8. Alan S. Blinder, ‘Pikettymania’ and Inequality in the U.S., Wall St. J. (June 22, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/alan-blinder-pikettymania-and-inequality-in-the-u-s-1403 477052 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 9. Piketty, supra note 4, at 1. 
 10. Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. Econ. 519, 520 (2016). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 520–21, 551–52. 
 13. Matthew Stewart, The 9.9 Percent Is the New American Aristocracy, Atlantic 
(June 2018), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/06/the-birth-of-a-new-
american-aristocracy/559130 [https://perma.cc/D3FV-Y9GB]. 
 14. Id. 
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though those groups together account for 35 percent of the total 
population.”15 The median net worth of a white family in the United 
States is $134,000, versus $11,000 for the median black family.16 In Boston, 
home to the greatest density of higher education institutions in the 
country,17 the median net worth of a nonimmigrant black household is $8.18 
There is a certain irony to this profusion of data on inequality, in 
that it is mainly manufactured and read by the new aristocracy itself. Yet 
this privileged group has ample reason to worry as well. Competition 
within the 9.9% is fierce, and only the highest ranks can comfortably 
absorb the rising costs of education, healthcare, housing, and environmen-
tal security that intraclass competition helps to produce.19 Meanwhile, 
every elite has something to fear from the social breakdown that such 
costs may precipitate when populations simply cannot pay, or are forced 
to pay in more gruesome currencies. 
Accordingly, a solidarity of fear—however partial or impermanent—
has taken hold. It is under these conditions that the egalitarian anxiety 
becomes an almost inescapable motivation for conscious and conscien-
tious legal thought. To dub our moment the age of inequality would 
require the fabrication of too many golden ages to count. But it is indeed 
an age of profound positional and distributional anxiety, an age when 
enduring, escalating, and intersectional forms of inequality have become 
a central object of legal study and reform. 
*  *  * 
In less than ten years, the egalitarian anxiety has made inroads across 
the legal academy. One of the most dramatic manifestations is the economic 
turn in constitutional theory and history, as the Great Recession stirred a 
number of scholars to diagnose these fields’ persistent neglect of consid-
erations of economic justice,20 and to begin to rectify that neglect. Today, 
                                                                                                                           
 15. Id. 
 16. Dedrick Asante-Muhammad et al., Inst. for Policy Studies & Prosperity Now, The 
Road to Zero Wealth: How the Racial Wealth Divide Is Hollowing Out America’s Middle 
Class 6 (2017), http://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-Road-to-Zero-Wealth_ 
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKH6-794L]. 
 17. Denis M. McSweeney & Walter J. Marshall, The Prominence of Boston Area 
Colleges and Universities, Monthly Lab. Rev., June 2009, at 64, 67. 
 18. Ana Patricia Muñoz et al., Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., The Color of Wealth in 
Boston 20 tbl.9 (2016), http://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/color-of-wealth/ 
color-of-wealth.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5Q2-JLR5]. 
 19. See, e.g., Steven Brill, Tailspin: The People and Forces Behind America’s Fifty-
Year Fall—and Those Fighting to Reverse It 17–46 (2018); Daniel Markovits, Yale Law 
School Commencement Address: A New Aristocracy (May 2015), http://law.yale.edu/system/ 
files/area/department/studentaffairs/document/markovitscommencementrev.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/HCY3-64V6]. 
 20. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in 
Constitutional Theory, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1445, 1466–94 (2016). 
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the relationship between constitutional law and economic inequality—or 
“constitutional political economy” more broadly21—represents one of the 
most generative subjects of constitutional scholarship, supplanting to some 
extent the legal-liberal preoccupation with describing and defending vari-
ants of living constitutionalism.22 While the economic turn in constitutional 
scholarship is particularly stark, considerations of social and material in-
equality have also galvanized research in fields more accustomed to thinking 
about the economic side of power. These include administrative law,23 
antidiscrimination law,24 antitrust law,25 banking law,26 consumer law,27 corpo-
rate law,28 criminal law,29 employment law,30 environmental law,31 family law,32 
                                                                                                                           
 21. See Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, Wealth, Commonwealth, and the 
Constitution of Opportunity, in Wealth: NOMOS LVIII 45, 46 (Jack Knight & Melissa 
Schwartzberg eds., 2017) (emphasis omitted); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Political Economy of 
“Constitutional Political Economy,” 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1527 passim (2016) [hereinafter 
Kessler, Political Economy]. 
 22. In the past four years alone, important works on constitutional political economy 
have proliferated. E.g., Christine Desan, Making Money: Coin, Currency, and the Coming 
of Capitalism (2014); Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional Change, 
and the Making of the 1960s (2016); Sophia Z. Lee, The Workplace Constitution: From 
the New Deal to the New Right (2015); Reuel Schiller, Forging Rivals: Race, Class, Law, 
and the Collapse of Postwar Liberalism (2015); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Crisis of the 
Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality Threatens Our Republic (2017); 
Karen M. Tani, States of Dependency: Welfare, Rights, and American Governance, 1935–
1972 (2016); Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks 
and Balances, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 419 (2015); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The 
Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 669 (2014); Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, 
Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 Calif. L. Rev. 
323 (2016); Symposium, The Constitution and Economic Equality, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1287 
(2016); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 
Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 4, 2014, at 195 [hereinafter Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism]. 
 23. E.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination (2016); David E. Pozen, 
Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1097 
(2017). 
 24. E.g., Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 Yale L.J. 2 (2018). 
 25. E.g., Lina Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale. L.J. 710 (2017). 
 26. E.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Other Half Banks: Exclusion, Exploitation, and 
the Threat to Democracy (2015). 
 27. E.g., Anne Fleming, City of Debtors: A Century of Fringe Finance (2018). 
 28. E.g., Corporations and American Democracy (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. 
Novak eds., 2017). 
 29. E.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness (rev. ed. 2012); James Forman Jr., Locking Up Our Own: Crime and 
Punishment in Black America (2018). 
 30. E.g., Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment-Discrimination Law 
in the Neoliberal Era, 92 Ind. L.J. 1059 (2017); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the 
Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 479 (2016). 
 31. E.g., Jedediah Purdy, After Nature: A Politics for the Anthropocene 45–50 (2015). 
 32. E.g., Katherine Franke, Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality (2015); Emily 
J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 1983 (2018). 
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human rights law,33 intellectual property law,34 labor law,35 and law and 
technology.36 
And then there is the First Amendment. Following the 2008 
financial crisis, the Roberts Court handed down a series of rulings that 
demonstrated the degree to which the First Amendment can be used to 
thwart economic and social welfare regulation—generating widespread 
accusations that the Court had created a “new Lochner.”37 The freedoms 
of speech, association, and religion have long been touted as the last 
nonviolent weapons by which the downtrodden can contest their 
subordination.38 But in cases such as Citizens United,39 Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc.,40 Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,41 
McCutcheon v. FEC,42 Harris v. Quinn,43 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.44 (the latter three all decided in early to mid-2014, at the height of 
                                                                                                                           
 33. E.g., Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018). 
 34. E.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond 
Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970 (2012). 
 35. E.g., Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 Yale L.J. 2 (2016). 
 36. E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Construction of 
Informational Capitalism (forthcoming 2019) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); 
Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and 
Information (2015). 
 37. Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 133 [hereinafter Shanor, 
New Lochner]; see also Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 
116 Colum. L. Rev. 1915, 1917–18 nn.5–8 (2016) [hereinafter Kessler, Early Years] 
(collecting sources published from 2011 to 2016 that suggest the First Amendment has 
been “hijacked” by antistatist, economically libertarian interests). 
 38. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970) 
(discussing the “safety valve” function of the First Amendment); Steven H. Shiffrin, 
Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America 128 (1999) (arguing that dissenters ought 
to be put “at the center of the First Amendment tradition” and that the “dissent model” of 
the First Amendment “has a strong political tilt against the unjust exercise of power”). 
 39. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down on First Amendment 
grounds federal restrictions on corporate “electioneering communications”). 
 40. 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (striking down on First Amendment grounds a Vermont law 
restricting the sale and disclosure of physicians’ prescription records). 
 41. 564 U.S. 721 (2011) (striking down on First Amendment grounds an Arizona law 
awarding “matching funds” to publicly funded candidates for state office whose privately 
funded opponents spend over a certain amount). 
 42. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (striking down on First Amendment grounds aggregate 
limits on federal campaign contributions). 
 43. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (striking down on First Amendment grounds the agency-
fee provision of Illinois’s Public Labor Relations Act). 
 44. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (striking down under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 (RFRA) federal regulations requiring closely held for-profit corporations to 
provide contraceptive coverage for their employees); see also Beckwith Elec. Co. v. 
Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (describing RFRA as the First 
Amendment’s “statutory corollary”); Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional 
Anomaly?, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 169, 172 n.11 (2015) (“Hobby Lobby was decided under 
[RFRA] but was quasi-constitutional in its reasoning and closely allied with the Court’s free 
exercise jurisprudence.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Pikettymania), the Court seemed to transform those weapons of the weak 
into one more resource that wealthy interests could deploy to preserve 
their advantages. From this point of view, the Roberts Court not only got 
the relevant civil liberties law wrong; it also displayed a reactionary 
commitment to using that law to entrench inequality in the face of a 
bruising recession. 
Four years later, the Roberts Court’s “Lochnerian” application of 
civil liberties law continues unchecked,45 leaving students of the First 
Amendment with more questions than answers. This introductory Essay 
to the Columbia Law Review’s 2018 Symposium, “A First Amendment for 
All? Free Expression in an Age of Inequality,” takes up three such 
questions:46 Why has First Amendment law become such a prominent site 
for struggles over socioeconomic inequality? Do First Amendment theory 
and precedent contain egalitarian elements that can be recovered? And 
what might a more egalitarian First Amendment look like today? The 
latter two questions also motivate the Symposium contributions published 
in the pages that follow. While a flurry of recent scholarship has helped 
to identify and critique the emergence of a substantively inegalitarian 
First Amendment, the search for a constitutionally compelling alternative 
has only just begun. Our aim in this Essay is to take stock of how the First 
Amendment arrived at this juncture and to sketch a roadmap for the 
legal journey ahead. 
                                                                                                                           
 45. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448 (2018) (holding that requiring nonmembers of public sector unions to pay fees 
toward collective bargaining violates the First Amendment); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life 
Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (striking down on First Amendment grounds 
a California law requiring pro-life pregnancy centers to provide certain factual 
information to patients); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 
(2017) (concluding that a New York law prohibiting merchants from imposing a surcharge 
on credit card purchases is a “speech regulation” and remanding to the court of appeals 
to determine whether the law violates the First Amendment); see also Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 
2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (lamenting that, “not [for] the first time,” the Roberts Court 
was “weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the 
future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy”); Adam Liptak, How Conservatives 
Weaponized the First Amendment, N.Y. Times (June 30, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/06/30/us/politics/first-amendment-conservatives-supreme-court.html (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (describing Janus and Becerra as “the latest in a stunning run of 
victories for a conservative agenda that has increasingly been built on the foundation of 
free speech”). There is little cause to believe that the replacement of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy with Justice Brett Kavanaugh will derail this trend. See Ken White, You’ll Hate This 
Post on Brett Kavanaugh and Free Speech, Popehat (July 10, 2018), http://www.popehat.com/ 
2018/07/10/youll-hate-this-post-on-brett-kavanaugh-and-free-speech [https://perma.cc/4YVK-
ECBT] (reviewing Kavanaugh’s appellate opinions and concluding that “[p]eople who buy 
into the ‘conservatives are weaponizing the First Amendment’ narrative will see him as a 
strong [weaponizer], in that he has applied the First Amendment to [invalidate] campaign 
finance laws, telecommunications regulation, and other aspects of the regulatory state”). 
 46. In keeping with the Symposium’s theme, we focus on free expression and largely 
bracket First Amendment jurisprudence relating to the freedoms of religion, press, 
assembly, and petition. 
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I. THE LONG ROAD TO THE ROBERTS COURT 
Judicial enforcement of First Amendment rights was once thought to 
be among the greenest pastures in the land of legal liberalism—the 
ideology that came to dominate the American legal academy in the 1960s 
and that sought to defend both the postwar welfare state and its reform 
by the Warren Court.47 Yet as explained above, a growing number of legal 
liberals have begun to view this pasture as a battlefield on which the most 
powerful socioeconomic actors occupy the highest ground.48 Scholars 
who share this anxious assessment disagree about the extent to which 
First Amendment inegalitarianism should be attributed to long-term 
trends in American political economy and civil liberties law or, instead, to 
a relatively recent doctrinal and ideological rupture with the past.49 
Those scholars who believe such a rupture has taken place, meanwhile, 
differ as to its timing. Cases decided by the Roberts Court, the Rehnquist 
Court, the Burger Court, and even the Stone Court have been singled 
out as the inflection point when First Amendment doctrine took its 
inegalitarian turn.50 Beneath these debates about causation and chronol-
ogy, however, lies a set of core propositions affirmed by nearly all 
participants: first, that there exists an inegalitarian tendency within First 
Amendment jurisprudence; second, that this tendency has become ever 
more pronounced during the Roberts Court era;51 and third, that First 
                                                                                                                           
 47. See generally Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy 
of Civil Libertarianism (1991); Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 
(1996); Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management 
(1995). 
 48. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 49. Compare, e.g., Kessler, Early Years, supra note 37, at 1922 (arguing that 
“contemporary critics of First Amendment Lochnerism have overstated the phenomenon’s 
novelty and understated the economically libertarian tendencies that may be intrinsic to 
judicial enforcement of civil liberties”), with Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: 
How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, New Republic (June 3, 2013), 
http://newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation 
[https://perma.cc/CMM6-UPJY] [hereinafter Wu, Right to Evade] (arguing that the “co-
opting of the First Amendment” has been enabled by “a new generation of conservative 
judges, who have repudiated the judicial restraint their forebears prized”). 
 50. Potential candidates include Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
444 U.S. 620 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); Lathrop v. Donohue, 
367 U.S. 820 (1961); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); and Murdock 
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). For further discussion of this chronology, see Kessler, 
Early Years, supra note 37, at 1917–22, 1992–2002. 
 51. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1453, 
1455–57 (2015); Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to Strike, 2017 U. Chi. 
Legal F. 513, 533–35; Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court v. America, Democracy (Winter 
2012), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/23/the-roberts-court-v-america [https:// 
perma.cc/GK6U-5LGM]; Wu, Right to Evade, supra note 49; Joseph Fishkin & William E. 
Forbath, Constitutional Political Economy When the Court Is to the Right of the Country, 
Balkinization (June 28, 2018), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/06/constitutional-political-
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Amendment inegalitarianism is particularly potent in the economic 
realm. 
A. First Amendment Lochnerism 
It is thanks to this third proposition that egalitarian anxieties about 
the First Amendment have come to be spelled out in the language of 
“Lochnerism.” By invoking the Supreme Court’s 1905 ruling in Lochner v. 
New York,52 legal theorists and practitioners suggest that today’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence serves a function similar to the early twenti-
eth century’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.53 In both cases, the 
argument goes, we see the federal courts using a select set of individual 
rights to protect the privileges of the economically powerful and to resist 
legislative and executive efforts to advance the interests of the economi-
cally marginal. Lochnerism provides a particularly vivid trope, or heuristic, 
with which to criticize judicial decisions that entrench economic 
inequality.54 
                                                                                                                           
economy-when.html [https://perma.cc/H85Q-D6J8]; cf. Lee Epstein et al., 6+ Decades of 
Freedom of Expression in the U.S. Supreme Court 9 (2018), http://epstein.wustl.edu/ 
research/FreedomOfExpression.pdf [https://perma.cc/MS3C-WZ5A] (finding empirically 
that “[e]ven as the Roberts Court has decided a smaller number of expression cases than 
its predecessors, it has accepted significantly more petitions in which the government (or 
some other body) suppressed conservative expression”). 
 52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Invocations of Lochnerism generally connote not just the 
Lochner ruling but a series of Fourteenth Amendment cases decided during the first 
Gilded Age, including Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 
U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 
U.S. 578 (1897). 
 53. For judicial uses of the Lochner analogy, see, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 
U.S. 552, 591–92, 602–03 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 
693 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., dissenting). For scholarly uses and defenses of the analogy, 
see, e.g., Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 323, 323–26 (2016) [hereinafter Garden, Deregulatory First Amendment]; 
Sepper, supra note 51, at 1459–507; Shanor, New Lochner, supra note 37, at 183–92; Purdy, 
Neoliberal Constitutionalism, supra note 22, at 196–203. As Professor Leslie Kendrick 
describes the contemporary constitutional landscape: 
[L]itigants claim immunity from laws regulating commercial conditions 
such as employee safety and benefits; the location and organization of 
businesses; the composition and labeling of foodstuffs, drugs, and 
commercial products; and the treatment of customers. These claims 
mirror Lochner-era claims in their structure: they posit a constitutional 
right, held by business interests (be they sole proprietors or corporate 
entities), which immunizes them from government regulation, often 
regulation that relies upon state interests in public health, safety, and 
welfare.  
The difference today is that the First Amendment is so often the 
designated vehicle for these antiregulatory impulses. 
Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1199, 1207–09 
(2015) [hereinafter Kendrick, Expansionism] (footnotes omitted). 
 54. Lochner comparisons have long served as a rhetorical strategy for anathematizing 
disfavored judicial decisions. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 
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While shaped by the historical analogy to a previous Gilded Age, the 
discourse of First Amendment Lochnerism does not focus exclusively on 
the economy. An aggressive, libertarian First Amendment, it is increas-
ingly recognized, has the potential to crowd out egalitarian norms across 
the social field, propagating inequalities of sex, gender, race, and reli-
gion along with inequalities of fiscal and cultural capital. Proponents of 
the Lochner analogy thus invoke or allude to it when criticizing a wide 
range of deregulatory First Amendment decisions. For example, the use 
of civil libertarian arguments to undermine antidiscrimination law has 
been identified by several scholars as a particularly worrisome form of 
modern-day Lochnerism.55 
Nonetheless, the problem of economic power remains central to the 
discourse, a testament to the trauma of the Great Recession as well as to 
the growing popularity of the view that economic inequality intersects 
with and reinforces other forms of inequality. From the black–white 
wealth gap and residential segregation to the special burdens that socially 
conservative employers impose on their female employees’ access to 
reproductive health care, debates over economic inequality have become 
seemingly inextricable from debates over racial and sexual inequality. 
The use of the First Amendment to affirm or advance any combination 
of these inequalities is liable to earn the Lochnerian epithet among 
today’s legal liberals. 
Some may find this epithet to be excessive. It is probably a stretch to 
claim that First Amendment law plays as direct a role in entrenching 
economic inequality today as substantive due process and equal 
protection law did in the Lochner era. On the other hand, there is a good 
deal of evidence that our conventional picture of the Lochner era is itself 
overdrawn: that the federal judiciary at the turn of the twentieth century 
was actually quite accommodating of new regulatory schemes aimed at 
ameliorating economic distress, upholding the vast majority of such 
schemes as valid uses of the states’ police powers or the federal 
government’s Commerce Clause authority.56 This Essay is not the place to 
                                                                                                                           
417–22 (2011). In many instances, the implied critique is simply that judges have 
overstepped their proper role, substituting their personal policy preferences for those of 
democratic majorities. Within the scholarly discourse of First Amendment Lochnerism, 
however, the comparison tends to be more substantive, criticizing not only imperious 
judges but also the programmatic use of individual rights to achieve deregulatory 
outcomes that favor well-capitalized parties. See Kessler, Early Years, supra note 37, at 
1917–25, 1992–2004. The use of the term “Lochnerism” more or less as an antonym of 
“egalitarianism” elides any number of historical and conceptual complexities, see sources 
cited infra note 56, but it remains a central feature of this discourse. 
 55. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 1205 (2014); Sepper, supra note 51; Nelson Tebbe, 
Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 25 (2015). 
 56. See generally David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner : Defending Individual 
Rights Against Progressive Reform (2011); Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal 
Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (1998); Howard Gillman, The 
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hash out this historical dispute. Suffice it to say here that perception goes 
a long way in the law. The egalitarian critiques that currently swirl around 
cases like Citizens United, Hobby Lobby, and Janus may one day be taught 
together with—and enjoy the same cachet as—the classic legal-realist and 
progressive critiques leveled against cases like Allgeyer, Adair, and Lochner. 
Whatever the future may bring, it is instructive to ask where the 
language of First Amendment Lochnerism comes from. Why have free 
expression and free exercise cases come to be linked with these long-
buried due process and equal protection cases? Why is First Amendment 
doctrine increasingly seen as our “Lochner,” our symbol of law’s complicity 
in plutocracy? 
B. The Rise and Fall of Progressive Civil Libertarianism 
The answer to these questions becomes slightly less mysterious in 
light of recent revisionist scholarship on early twentieth-century civil 
liberties law. According to the revisionists, the “traditional” model of civil 
liberties law as the judicial enforcement of individuals’ noneconomic 
rights against state interference was itself a rightward departure from the 
progressive civil libertarianism of the initial decades of the twentieth 
century. Prior to World War II, revisionists maintain, the progressive 
lawyers, administrators, and activists who first championed federal 
protection of civil libertarian rights did so in the hope of building a more 
economically just, culturally pluralistic society.57 Such a society would be 
typified by a strong labor movement; by a powerful but porous 
                                                                                                                           
Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 
(1993); Claudio J. Katz, Protective Labor Legislation in the Courts: Substantive Due 
Process and Fairness in the Progressive Era, 31 Law & Hist. Rev. 275 (2013). 
 57. Significant works of revisionism include Megan Ming Francis, Civil Rights and the 
Making of the Modern American State (2014); Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil 
Rights (2007) [hereinafter Goluboff, Lost Promise]; Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil 
Liberties: Discontinuities in the Development of American Constitutional Law (2004); 
Sam Lebovic, Free Speech and Unfree News: The Paradox of Press Freedom in America 
(2016); Victor Pickard, America’s Battle for Media Democracy: The Triumph of Corporate 
Libertarianism and the Future of Media Reform (2014); Laura Weinrib, The Taming of 
Free Speech: America’s Civil Liberties Compromise (2016) [hereinafter Weinrib, Taming 
of Free Speech]; John Fabian Witt, Patriots and Cosmopolitans: Hidden Histories of 
American Law (2007); William E. Forbath, Politics, State-Building, and the Courts, 1870–
1920, in 2 The Cambridge History of Law in America 643 (Michael Grossberg & 
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern 
Civil Liberties Law, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (2014) [hereinafter Kessler, Administrative 
Origins]; Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the 
Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Karen M. Tani, Welfare 
and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 Yale L.J. 314 
(2012); Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 Sup. Ct. Rev. 297 
[hereinafter Weinrib, Outside the Courts]; Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutionalism’s 
Hard when You’re Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to the Courts, 42 Law & Soc’y 
Rev. 367 (2008); and Carrie DeCell, Note, Deweyan Democracy and the Administrative 
State, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 580 (2011). 
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administrative state, continually solicitous of and transformed by public 
participation; and by the privileging of collective welfare over individual 
interest. Federal courts—the inveterate guardians of private property and 
persecutors of organized labor—had little role to play in this vision. 
Instead, its proponents focused their energies on administrative and 
legislative enforcement of civil liberties, especially the liberties of work-
ers, political dissenters, and vulnerable minorities.58 Free expression and 
federal regulation were seen as complementary tools in the struggle for 
socioeconomic equality. This vision achieved its fullest embodiment in 
the design, staffing, and early operation of New Deal agencies such as the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), and the Civil Liberties Unit of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ).59 
By portraying early twentieth-century civil libertarianism as a 
relatively statist, collectivist, and labor-oriented project, revisionist 
scholarship helps to clarify the institutional and ideological roots of 
today’s First Amendment Lochnerism. For if the revisionist story is 
correct, then before the First Amendment could be Lochnerized, it had 
to be judicialized, individualized, and shorn of its prolabor bias. 
According to the revisionists, this is exactly what began to happen in the 
mid-to-late 1930s, as a coalition of conservative lawyers and businessmen 
took aim at those aspects of the administrative state most indebted to the 
progressive civil libertarian cause, such as the NLRB.60 In a conscious 
                                                                                                                           
 58. Not all of those legal and political activists who considered themselves both “pro-
gressive” and “civil libertarian” would have agreed with every aspect of this summary 
account. In particular, the more radical proponents of sexual freedom and labor self-
management tended to be less trusting of the administrative state as a vehicle of reform; 
they also occasionally scored victories in the courts. See, e.g., Laura M. Weinrib, The Sex 
Side of Civil Liberties: United States v. Dennett and the Changing Face of Free Speech, 30 
Law & Hist. Rev. 325, 326–27 (2012) (describing litigation campaigns against the regula-
tion of birth control and “obscene” speech); see also Weinrib, Outside the Courts, supra 
note 57, at 312–15 (noting that “Communists and other radicals who opposed [the 
National Labor Relations Act] framed their objections as civil liberties concerns” and that 
this framing influenced the lobbying of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)). The 
presence of this dissenting bloc within the progressive civil libertarian coalition highlights 
the popularity and success that the more statist and court-skeptic fractions enjoyed during 
the 1930s. 
 59. See, e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, Labor and Liberty: The La Follette Committee and 
the New Deal 8–11, 51–73 (1966) (discussing the NLRB’s ideology); Susan L. Brinson, The 
Red Scare, Politics, and the Federal Communications Commission, 1941–1960, at 5–59 
(2004) (discussing the FCC’s progressive origins and the influence of “New Deal liberal-
ism” on early FCC policies); Goluboff, Lost Promise, supra note 57, at 111–24 (discussing 
the formation and leadership of the Civil Liberties Unit); see also Weinrib, Outside the 
Courts, supra note 57, at 304 (explaining that “New Deal reformers who called for active 
intervention in the economy also . . . advocated adjustments in the marketplace of ideas to 
correct distortions stemming from inequality of access or relative power” and generally 
“sought to implement that vision in spite of, rather than through, the courts”). 
 60. See generally Weinrib, Taming of Free Speech, supra note 57, at 226–310; Kessler, 
Early Years, supra note 37, at 1925–36; Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 
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attempt to wrest the civil libertarian banner from the New Deal’s 
progressive wing, this coalition argued that the administrative state, both 
at the national and local level, had become a threat to free expression 
and association, imposing ideological conformity on everyone from 
street preachers to corporate lobbyists.61 The obvious, if hyperbolic, 
parallels were Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.62 To check such 
“administrative absolutism,” the new civil libertarians called for the 
reassertion of judicial power—in particular, for vigorous judicial 
protection of every individual’s rights to free expression and procedural 
due process, without regard to his or her relative economic power or 
substantive political goals.63 
Despite the anti–New Deal origins of the new civil libertarianism, 
several factors in the late 1930s conspired to make it attractive to a 
growing number of moderate lawyers and politicians as well. Particularly 
troubling to these on-and-off New Dealers was President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s 1937 campaign for judicial reorganization and executive 
consolidation, a campaign fatefully launched just as the American 
economy slipped back into recession and the New Deal’s left flank 
championed an unpopular strike wave in the automobile industry.64 Such 
domestic upheaval looked even more ominous in light of the brutal 
programs of fascist and communist social reform then sweeping 
Europe.65 To curtail the more “totalitarian” tendencies of administrative 
governance while affirming the basic legitimacy of the New Deal, the 
mainstream legal community engineered a sort of Solomonic compromise, 
in which civil libertarian rights to free expression, political participation, 
religious liberty, and procedural due process were both hailed as a shield 
against bureaucratic domination and sharply distinguished from rights to 
economic liberty.66 The former, noneconomic rights were to be guarded 
jealously by the federal judiciary. The latter, economic rights were to be 
                                                                                                                           
Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
52–62 (2017). 
 61. See Weinrib, Taming of Free Speech, supra note 57, at 271. 
 62. See Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges 
in America, 1900–1940, at 125–27, 137 (2014); see also Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for 
Administrative Legitimacy, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 718, 750 n.137 (2016) [hereinafter Kessler, 
Administrative Legitimacy] (collecting sources on the deployment of this analogy). 
 63. E.g., Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 Ann. Rep. 
A.B.A. 331, 343–68 (1938). 
 64. See Barry D. Karl, The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945, at 139, 
154–58 (1983); Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt’s Government: The Controversy 
over Executive Reorganization, 1936–1939, at 55–78 (1966). 
 65. See Joanna L. Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State: Administrative Politics 
Since the New Deal 18 (2012); Karl, supra note 64, at 168; Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The 
New Deal and the Origins of Our Time 173–82 (2013). 
 66. See generally Richard A. Primus, The American Language of Rights 177–233 
(1999); Kessler, Administrative Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 757–73; Weinrib, Outside the 
Courts, supra note 57, at 348–60. 
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entrusted largely to Congress and the President, who would calibrate and 
recalibrate them in the interests of national prosperity and security. 
Today, we associate this redistribution of individual rights and 
institutional responsibilities with Footnote Four of Carolene Products.67 
And that footnote is indeed a gnomic testament to the “liberal 
compromise”68 (as Professor Laura Weinrib has labeled it) that, in 1938, 
was gradually displacing progressive civil libertarianism. The work of the 
most moderate Republicans on the Supreme Court, Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone and Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the footnote represented 
their effort to negotiate the extremes of irresponsible conservative 
antistatism and irresponsible progressive collectivism.69 
It may seem odd to think of the advent of bifurcated review as the 
first step toward First Amendment Lochnerism. Carolene Products’ 
hallowed distinction between civil liberty and economic liberty is 
precisely what First Amendment Lochnerism is said to erode.70 Yet the 
liberal compromise of the late 1930s and early 1940s established many of 
the conditions, or preconditions, that would later enable First 
Amendment Lochnerism to thrive. It rescued the courts from decades of 
left-wing critique, recasting them as classless custodians of universal 
values. By the same token, it elevated the judiciary above the 
administrative state as the ultimate bulwark of republican self-
government. The once reactionary framing of the administrative state as 
an intrinsic threat to personal freedom and private ordering—rather 
than the only institution capable of securing a competitive economy and 
fair society—was more or less accepted across the legal profession. 
Finally, the liberal compromise “neutralized” the theory and practice of 
civil libertarianism, transforming a field that had been identified, above 
all, with workers’ rights to organize, picket, and strike71 into a set of 
formal limitations on what democracy could demand of any individual or 
group. As the liberal compromise became the new orthodoxy, admitting 
considerations of economic power into free speech analysis began to feel 
more like pollution than pragmatism to the champions of bifurcated 
review. 
                                                                                                                           
 67. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 68. See generally Laura M. Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and 
the Limits of State Power, 1917–1940 (May 1, 2011) [hereinafter Weinrib, Liberal Compromise] 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University), http://chicagounbound.uchicago. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=other_publications (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). This felicitous term captures the political defeats that produced midcentury 
“liberalism.” 
 69. Kessler, Early Years, supra note 37, at 1925–56. 
 70. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Property Is the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional 
Revolution, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1452, 1471–72 (2015) (discussing the ways in which legal liber-
als contrast bifurcated review with Lochnerism). 
 71. Weinrib, Outside the Courts, supra note 57, at 297. 
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The empowerment of the federal courts, the suspicion of administra-
tive governance, and the insistence on formal neutrality in the enforce-
ment of civil libertarian rights all smoothed the way for the co-optation of 
the First Amendment by the economically powerful. If the liberal com-
promise did not more quickly devolve into First Amendment Lochnerism, 
historical contingencies account for much of the delay. For instance, the 
political composition of the midcentury judiciary, dominated by a dec-
ade’s worth of Roosevelt appointees, limited extensions of the First 
Amendment in obviously inegalitarian directions.72 At the same time, a 
relatively bipartisan embrace of the logic of Cold War kept the most 
rabid critics of public spending and regulation on the constitutional mar-
gins. Antistatism, whether right wing or left wing, was difficult to square 
with the fiscal and institutional demands of “competing” with the Soviet 
Union for global hegemony.73 Just as these factors slowed the drift toward 
First Amendment Lochnerism, they also help explain the real attractions 
of the liberal compromise. In a period of rapid economic growth and 
declining economic inequality,74 that compromise offered left-leaning 
lawyers a principled basis for resisting racially discriminatory state and 
                                                                                                                           
 72. See Rayman L. Solomon, The Politics of Appointment and the Federal Courts’ 
Role in Regulating America: U.S. Courts of Appeals Judgeships from T.R. to F.D.R., 9 Am. 
B. Found. Res. J. 285, 323–27, 341–43 (1984) (describing the unprecedented role that 
judicial ideology and policy considerations played in President Roosevelt’s Article III 
nominations following the Senate’s rejection of wholesale judicial reorganization in July 
1937). More than two-thirds of Roosevelt’s Article III appointments—130 out of 193 total, 
including all nine Supreme Court appointments—occurred during the post-court-packing 
phase of his presidency. See Biographical Directory of Federal Article III Judges, 1789–
Present, Fed. Judicial Ctr., http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/5GWS-
LMFM] (last visited Sept. 11, 2018). Nor did New Deal policy preferences cease to influ-
ence the bench after Roosevelt’s death. Between Harry Truman’s elevation to the presi-
dency in 1945 and the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, pro–New Deal Democrats 
(Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson) appointed 443 Article III judges, 
while the sole Republican President during those years (Dwight D. Eisenhower) appointed 
182. Id. It was during this period that presidential ideology displaced the traditional 
politics of party patronage as the dominant influence on the judicial appointment process. 
See David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of 
Supreme Court Nominees 1–19 (1999) (describing this new pattern of ideological influ-
ence); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 
87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1064–80 (2001) (identifying presidential selection of federal judges on 
an ideological basis as the chief vehicle of “partisan entrenchment” in post–New Deal 
constitutional law). 
 73. See Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-
Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy 69–75 (2000) (discussing the “stable strategic 
synthesis” that emerged from ideological tensions between anticommunism and antistat-
ism in the wake of World War II); Julian E. Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of 
National Security—From World War II to the War on Terrorism 4–8 (2010) (elaborating 
on the partisan political aspects of this dynamic). 
 74. See David Singh Grewal, Closing Remarks: Law and Inequality After the Crisis, 35 
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 337, 338–39 (2016) (discussing the “exceptional period” of widely 
shared growth from roughly 1945 to 1975 and listing the “superlatives” by which it is 
known in various countries). 
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local laws while moderating two of the most threatening aspects of Cold 
War political culture: the repression of dissenting voices in the name of 
national security and the rollback of the welfare state in the name of the 
free market. The conditions of moderation, however, began to erode in 
the 1970s, as the New Deal generation dwindled, the postwar economic 
boom petered out, and inflation made deregulation and austerity 
increasingly bipartisan commitments.75 Those commitments, moreover, 
would no longer be checked to the same degree by arguments from 
national security, as failure in Vietnam precipitated a leaner and less 
visible national security state.76 All three branches of government shifted 
rightward.77 
While this shift was underway, the Burger Court’s commercial 
speech,78 campaign finance,79 and religious funding 80 decisions elicited a 
brief flurry of scholarship warning of—or celebrating—the erosion of the 
distinction between civil and economic liberty.81 It was at this moment 
that anxieties about “Lochnerization” of the First Amendment first 
surfaced in the law reviews.82 Cases in which “individuals or groups 
commonly thought of as ‘conservative’ took up the First Amendment 
cudgels against regulatory forces supported by individuals or groups 
commonly thought to be ‘liberals’” began to multiply in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, both in the economic realm and beyond.83 Yet when all was 
said and done, the Burger Court’s transformative First Amendment 
jurisprudence did surprisingly little to dislodge scholarly support for the 
                                                                                                                           
 75. See id. at 339 (“Starting in the 1970s and 1980s—and continuing through to 
today—inequality reasserted itself, with increasing vigor . . . .”); see also Judith Stein, Pivotal 
Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies, at ix–xxii 
(2010) (describing both parties’ rejection of midcentury political economy). 
 76. See Zelizer, supra note 73, at 234–36 (describing the politics of this change in 
grand strategy). 
 77. See Michael J. Graetz & Linda Greenhouse, The Burger Court and the Rise of the 
Judicial Right 1–10 (2016) (describing the rightward shift in the courts); Laura Kalman, 
Right Star Rising: A New Politics, at xviii–xxi, 353–66 (2010) (describing the rightward 
shift in the political branches). 
 78. E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 79. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 80. E.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); United States v. Lee, 
455 U.S. 252 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Waltz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 81. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to 
the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 384 [hereinafter Balkin, Some Realism]; 
Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process 
and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1, 30–33 (1979); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on 
Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363, 1387–88 (1984). 
 82. See, e.g., Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 81, at 30–31; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s 
Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 883–84 (1987). 
 83. Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 935, 941 (1993). 
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liberal compromise. During the Rehnquist Court years, from 1986 to 
2005, the legal academy generally continued to treat the distinction 
between civil and economic liberty as sacrosanct, a precious fragment of 
the crumbling New Deal constitutional order, and spoke rarely about the 
dangers of First Amendment Lochnerism.84 Such faith would be sorely 
tested by the Great Recession. 
II. INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM, THE INFORMATION STATE, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT–INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
If Lochnerian currents were always swirling just beneath the surface 
of postwar First Amendment law, over the past decade they have flooded 
the legal landscape. The timing of this flood may seem strange from a 
strategic perspective. With Americans facing high unemployment, col-
lapsing wages, and mounting household debt in the late 2000s, consid-
erations of institutional legitimacy presumably counseled against bold 
judicial experiments in deregulation. The contemporaneous “rediscov-
ery”85 of economic inequality by the mass media and mainstream policy-
makers cast these experiments in an especially harsh light. One does not 
need to read Piketty, however, to guess that equating corporations’ rights 
to spend money, sell data, and trim benefits with citizens’ First 
Amendment rights might prove controversial in a world of bank bailouts 
and mortgage foreclosures. Why did the Court choose such an unpropi-
tious moment to take a wrecking ball to the already-unstable boundary 
between freedom of expression and freedom from economic regulation? 
One answer might be that it was only shortly before the financial 
crisis that the Court gained the necessary votes to do so. Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor and Chief Justice William Rehnquist had long resisted the 
expansive approach to defining and protecting commercial speech 
favored by their successors, Justice Samuel Alito and Chief Justice John 
Roberts.86 When O’Connor retired in late 2005, the original vision of the 
liberal compromise went out the door with her. By the end of the George 
                                                                                                                           
 84. But cf., e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 Utah L. 
Rev. 659, 661 (“The First Amendment . . . has become the locus of a new Lochnerism—or 
rather, a revival of the old Lochnerism under a new doctrinal label.”); Morton J. Horwitz, 
The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal 
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 30, 109–16 (1993) (critiquing 
the “Lochnerization of the First Amendment” since the end of the Warren Court). A 2006 
symposium in the Northern Kentucky Law Review brought sustained attention to “First 
Amendment Lochnerism” for the first time in years. See generally Symposium, First 
Amendment Lochnerism? Emerging Constitutional Limitations on Government Regulation 
of Non-Speech Economic Activity, 33 N. Ky. L. Rev. 365 (2006). 
 85. See generally Grewal & Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, supra note 4. 
 86. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Libertarian-Lite Constitutional Order and the 
Rehnquist Court, 93 Geo. L.J. 1023, 1049 (2005) (observing that in commercial speech 
cases in which the Rehnquist Court engaged in “Lochner-izing under the guise of the First 
Amendment,” the “more pro-government view [was] taken by Justices Rehnquist, 
O’Connor and Breyer”). 
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W. Bush Administration, the conservative legal movement had finally 
produced a Supreme Court majority sufficiently committed to First 
Amendment Lochnerism—or sufficiently indifferent to its inegalitarian 
effects—to risk popular backlash in the midst of a recession. 
However plausible this electoral explanation may be, fixating on 
judicial personalities risks obscuring deeper connections between the 
political economic structure of the First Amendment disputes the Roberts 
Court has confronted and the deregulatory doctrines it has crafted. Recent 
scholarship on the political economy of our digital age suggests several 
factors that may have helped to catalyze First Amendment Lochnerism in 
the present period.87 
To begin with, transformations in the capitalist system have imbued 
more and more economic activity with communicative content. The Roberts 
Court’s tenure has coincided with an “ongoing shift from an industrial 
mode of development to an informational one,”88 a shift that has radically 
reconfigured the processes, products, and personnel through which 
capital is accumulated and commodities are created and exchanged.89 
Synthesizing the insights of economists, political scientists, social theorists, 
and technologists, legal scholar Julie Cohen highlights two “fundamental 
transformations” bound up with our relatively recent passage from a 
predominantly industrial to a predominantly informational economy: 
First is a movement away from an economy oriented principally 
toward manufacturing and related activities toward one oriented 
principally toward the production, accumulation and process-
ing of information. In an information economy, the mass model 
of production that emerged in the industrial era is itself increasingly 
redirected toward development of intellectual and informational 
goods and services, production and distribution of consumer 
information technologies, and ownership of service-delivery 
enterprises. Second is a transformation in the conduct of even 
traditional industrial activity. In an information economy, infor-
mation technology assumes an increasingly prominent role in 
                                                                                                                           
 87. As with all bodies of scholarship touched on in this Essay, we cannot remotely do 
justice here to the breadth or depth of this literature. Prominent book-length examples 
include Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom (2006); Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: 
Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics (2009); Jack Goldsmith & Tim Wu, Who 
Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World (2006); Bernard E. Harcourt, 
Exposed: Desire and Disobedience in the Digital Age (2015); Pasquale, supra note 36; 
Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (2017); and Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants: The 
Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads (2016). 
 88. Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 Theoretical 
Inquiries L. 369, 370 (2016) [hereinafter Cohen, Regulatory State]. 
 89. See generally 1 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: The 
Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (2d ed. 2000); Dan Schiller, How to 
Think About Information (2007). 
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the control of industrial production and in the management of 
all kinds of enterprises.90 
Following sociologist Manuel Castells,91 Cohen identifies these 
developments with the rise of “informational capitalism.”92 Two years into 
the financial crisis, political theorist Jodi Dean arrived at a similar 
diagnosis, warning of the rise of “communicative capitalism.”93 Whatever 
one calls it, this emergent mode of capitalist organization is not 
restricted to those “new” sectors of the economy focused on the creation 
and exchange of data. Rather, the creation and exchange of data suffuse 
the manufacturing and service sectors as well.94 There, the relative speed 
and accuracy of communication among managers, producers, and 
consumers become keys to maximizing return and minimizing risk. 
These developments make it increasingly difficult to separate 
economic activity from expressive activity—and thus to maintain the 
distinction at the heart of the liberal compromise. A great deal of 
economic activity has long had some sort of communicative dimension. 
But as the locus of profit-making migrates from the production, 
accumulation, and processing of material goods to the production, 
accumulation, and processing of information (usually in digital form), 
the creation and circulation of information, as such, assumes a far more 
prominent role in the economy while the metaphor of information 
assumes a far more prominent role in the culture. Doing business in the 
twenty-first century means dealing with data, and because “data is 
expressed in alphanumeric symbols, it certainly looks a lot more like 
traditional speech” than, say, making steel or plowing a field.95 In turn, 
the standard justification for affording First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech—that it serves the interests of listeners in making 
                                                                                                                           
 90. Cohen, Regulatory State, supra note 88, at 371 (footnote omitted). 
 91. See 1 Castells, supra note 89, at 18–21 (defining “informational capitalism”). 
 92. Cohen, Regulatory State, supra note 88, at 370–71, 414. 
 93. See generally Dean, supra note 87. As with other social theorists grounded in 
historical materialism, Castells, Cohen, and Dean do not assume a sharp break between 
one “mode of production” and another (whether from feudalism to capitalism, or 
industrial capitalism to informational capitalism). See, e.g., Cohen, Regulatory State, supra 
note 88, at 371 (noting that “the relationship between industrialism and informationalism 
is not sequential, but rather cumulative, and the emergence of informationalism as a 
mode of economic development is powerfully shaped by its articulation within capitalist 
modes of production”). The term “informational” or “communicative” capitalism is best 
understood as marking a change in the activities and technologies most essential to profit-
making in a given social formation dominated by the capitalist mode of production. Cf. 
Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism 59–77 (1980) (discussing how a 
single, historically delimited social formation may exhibit variety both within and across 
modes of production). 
 94. See, e.g., Louis Columbus, Ten Ways Big Data Is Revolutionizing Manufacturing, 
Forbes (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2014/11/28/ten-
ways-big-data-is-revolutionizing-manufacturing [https://perma.cc/9Z7X-HPRH]. 
 95. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 59 (2014). 
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informed decisions—expands to include the interests of commercial 
actors in imparting, or withholding, valuable information.96 
An additional feature of informational capitalism extends the poten-
tial reach of First Amendment Lochnerism: the dominant role played by 
private owners of the platforms through which information circulates 
online and within which ever more data is commodified and mined for 
economic value. Even though they control the infrastructure of digital 
communication and function as the “new governors” of the digital public 
sphere, companies like Facebook and Google are generally assumed to 
not be bound by the First Amendment because they are not state actors.97 
Instead of empowering users to challenge their policies, the First 
Amendment empowers the companies themselves to challenge statutes 
and regulations intended to promote antidiscrimination norms or users’ 
speech and privacy, among other values.98 First Amendment law not only 
fails to check the internet’s new governors and the inequalities that 
pervade their platforms99 but also stands in the way of legislative and 
administrative correctives. 
The old governors, meanwhile, face an additional set of civil 
libertarian obstacles as the “neoliberal” turn in public administration has 
gradually substituted the management of information for the policing of 
conduct. Neoliberalism, as the term is used here, refers to an ideology 
                                                                                                                           
 96. See, e.g., id. at 87 (arguing based on a “right to create knowledge” that “direct 
regulations of data should draw [First Amendment] scrutiny”); see also Heather Whitney, 
Knight First Amendment Inst., Search Engines, Social Media, and the Editorial Analogy 3–
7 (2018), http://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Heather_Whitney_Search_ 
Engines_Editorial_Analogy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6J36-AGCX] (describing the largely 
successful efforts of technology companies to analogize the decisions they make about 
their platforms to the editorial judgments made by publishers, for purposes of claiming 
First Amendment protection); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A 
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 19 
(2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech] (“[B]usinesses argue [that] regulation of the 
distribution network is a regulation of the freedom of speech of the network owner, 
because the network owner ‘speaks’ through its decisions about which content to favor 
and disfavor.”). 
 97. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1598, 1610–11, 1658–59 (2018). 
 98. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Political Economy of Freedom of Speech in the Second 
Gilded Age, Law & Pol. Econ. (July 4, 2018), http://lpeblog.org/2018/07/04/the-
political-economy-of-freedom-of-speech-in-the-second-gilded-age [https://perma.cc/B9KQ-
MR8D] (“The First Amendment . . . may be a potential obstacle to laws that would try to 
regulate the owners of private infrastructure to protect freedom of speech and privacy. 
One example would be first amendment attacks on network neutrality. A second would be 
first amendment defenses against privacy regulations . . . .”). 
 99. See, e.g., Olivier Sylvain, Knight First Amendment Inst., Discriminatory Designs 
on User Data 3, 8–16 (2018), http://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/ 
Sylvain_Emerging_Threats.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU5V-WBRC] (describing numerous 
ways in which “online engagement [is] more difficult for children, women, racial 
minorities, and other predictable targets of harassment and discriminatory expressive 
conduct”). 
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and mode of governance that favors “the imperatives of market econo-
mies . . . deployed to further capital accumulation” over “nonmarket 
values grounded in the requirements of democratic legitimacy.”100 The 
neoliberal preference is not necessarily for “free markets” in any strict 
sense, but for a regulatory environment that prioritizes “familiar 
protections of property and contract” along with “a favorable return on 
investment and managerial authority.”101 In our digital age, the 
facilitation of these preferences has fallen to the “information state,” the 
set of national (or international) bureaucracies that oversee the 
operations of informational capitalism.102 Within these bureaucracies, 
“mandates or bans on conduct”—such as traditional labor laws, wage and 
price controls, or licensing regimes—are apt to be rejected as overly 
market-disruptive and replaced whenever possible with “‘lighter-touch’ 
forms of governance . . . such as disclosure requirements” and other 
regulatory techniques that further the production and circulation of 
commercially salient information.103 As Professor Amanda Shanor has 
detailed, one effect of this trend is to make today’s regulations “more 
prone to appear speech-regulating” and, hence, more vulnerable to First 
Amendment challenge.104 Whereas banning or taxing most commercial 
practices (for instance, the use of “conflict minerals”) is unlikely to raise 
any First Amendment issues under existing law, requiring firms to 
publish information pertaining to these practices (for instance, through 
                                                                                                                           
 100. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 
Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 2–3. 
 101. Id. at 3. The fusion of Cohen’s two “fundamental transformations”—the pre-
dominance of information as both (1) a commodity and medium of exchange and (2) a 
means of managing production and exchange—is most fully achieved in the financial 
services sector. There, securitization enables the reduction of almost any perceived ineffi-
ciency to another piece of saleable information. Scholars from across the academy have 
identified this primacy of financial services, underwritten by the ease of securitization in 
the digital marketplace, as a key feature of neoliberalism. See, e.g., David M. Kotz, 
Financialization and Neoliberalism, in Relations of Global Power: Neoliberal Order and 
Disorder 1, 1 (Gary Teeple & Stephen McBride eds., 2011) (“A common view is that the 
rise of neoliberalism is explained by the growing role and power of finance in the political 
economy of capitalism.”); Marc Lavoie, Financialization, Neo-Liberalism, and Securitization, 
35 J. Post Keynesian Econ. 215, 215, 225–31 (2012) (discussing the “generalization of 
securitization” and its role in neoliberal economic theory and the 2008 financial crisis). 
 102. Shanor, New Lochner, supra note 37, at 163; cf. Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: 
The Wars for the Twenty-First Century 85–90 (2008) (describing the ongoing transition 
from twentieth-century industrial “nation states” to contemporary informational “market 
states”). 
 103. Shanor, New Lochner, supra note 37, at 137, 165; see also David E. Pozen, Transparency’s 
Ideological Drift, 128 Yale L.J. 100, 123–59 (2018) [hereinafter Pozen, Ideological Drift] 
(discussing, in connection with neoliberalism, the turn toward transparency requirements 
and away from “substantive” regulation in the United States over the past several decades). 
 104. Shanor, New Lochner, supra note 37, at 164, 171. 
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regular reports on their mineral sourcing) may give rise to claims of 
unconstitutionally compelled speech.105 
At the same time that it makes economic regulation more 
susceptible to First Amendment scrutiny, the turn toward “lighter-touch” 
governance saps such regulation of much of its redistributive potential. 
From the standpoint of individuals lacking in market expertise or capital 
endowments, these new forms of governance can be perverse. Not only 
do they fail to produce the levelling effects of traditional regulatory mecha-
nisms aimed at labor–capital parity, but disclosure mandates and the like 
also often end up “hurting the people [they] purport[] to help” by lull-
ing consumers into complacency, insulating compliant companies from 
antifraud liability, and undercutting political will for more substantive 
policy measures.106 In other words, the same “informational” focus that 
exposes neoliberal governance to civil libertarian challenges from regu-
lated parties also tends to set internal limits on the equality-enhancing 
capacities of the administrative state. 
Just beyond the formal boundaries of the informational state and 
the informational marketplace lies a final set of institutions that contrib-
utes to contemporary Lochnerism: nonprofit, nongovernmental organ-
izations dedicated to First Amendment advocacy. As the First Amendment’s 
deregulatory potential has become more evident, the economic surplus 
enjoyed by wealthy firms and executives has increasingly fed back into 
such organizations. Dissenting Supreme Court Justices107 and mainstream 
media outlets108 called attention this past Term to the “weaponization” of 
the First Amendment by a well-funded network of advocacy groups, such 
as the Alliance Defending Freedom, the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty, the Institute for Justice (IJ), the Liberty Justice Center, and the 
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation (NRWLDF). The 
efforts of these groups follow in the mold of, and build upon, the highly 
effective campaign to advance commercial speech rights that business 
                                                                                                                           
 105. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 370–73 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(partially invalidating under the First Amendment a 2012 Securities and Exchange 
Commission rule requiring firms using conflict minerals to disclose their origin); see also 
Garden, Deregulatory First Amendment, supra note 53, at 339–51 (explaining that claims 
of “compelled speech” have become a key tool for proponents of a deregulatory, antilabor 
First Amendment). 
 106. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 651 (2011); see also Pozen, Ideological Drift, supra note 103, at 135–41 
(elaborating on these points). 
 107. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2501–02 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 108. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 45; Dahlia Lithwick et al., Kneecapping Unions and 
Weaponizing the First Amendment, Slate (July 2, 2018), http://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/07/janus-becerra-masterpiece-cakeshop-the-supreme-court-terms-big-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/HRY6-KLLJ]. 
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interests have been leading since the 1970s.109 Over the past two decades, 
nonprofits dedicated to religious freedom have joined the fray, some-
times supported by the same donors who fund commercial speech advo-
cacy as well as parallel campaigns against legal protections for organized 
labor.110 
Within the broader conservative legal movement that has arisen 
since the 1970s,111 there now exists, then, something of a First Amendment–
industrial complex. Mapping the contours of this complex is well beyond 
the scope of this Essay. The basic point, for present purposes, is that 
arguments for a deregulatory First Amendment are now promoted not 
only (or even primarily) by for-profit companies seeking to minimize 
their own labor costs or regulatory burdens, but also by a growing set of 
nominally depoliticized nonprofits with varying degrees of connection to 
the business community. 
In this regard, a critic of First Amendment Lochnerism may have 
cause to worry about the establishment, within the past year alone, of 
numerous First Amendment clinics and centers at law schools around the 
country.112 Organized as public interest law firms or as 501(c)(3) “public 
                                                                                                                           
 109. See Garden, Deregulatory First Amendment, supra note 53, at 325–31; Shanor, 
New Lochner, supra note 37, at 155–63. The 1970s commercial speech campaign itself built 
upon the midcentury efforts of wealthy conservative activists, such as Cecil B. DeMille, who 
helped to create a network of nongovernmental organizations committed to the legal 
expansion of economic, religious, and expressive freedom. See generally Brinson, supra 
note 59, at 61–140; Kevin M. Kruse, One Nation Under God: How Corporate America 
Invented Christian America 27–34, 127–61 (2015); Lee, supra note 22, at 56–78, 115–32; 
Pickard, supra note 57, at 75–96. 
 110. The Koch brothers, for instance, have supported the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty, IJ, and NRWLDF, among many other groups active in the First Amendment area. 
See Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of 
the Radical Right 178 (2016) (IJ); Jay Riestenberg & Mary Bottari, Who Is Behind the 
National Right to Work Committee and Its Anti-Union Crusade?, Huffington Post (Aug. 5, 
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-bottari/who-is-behind-the-nationa_b_5451743.html 
[https://perma.cc/6MK5-25TQ] (NRWLDF); Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The Spirit and the 
Law: How the Becket Fund Became the Leading Advocate for Corporations’ Religious 
Rights, Am. Prospect (June 18, 2014), http://prospect.org/article/little-known-force-behind-
hobby-lobby-contraception-case [https://perma.cc/LQN3-5MAK] (Becket Fund). 
 111. See generally Jefferson Decker, The Other Rights Revolution: Conservative 
Lawyers and the Remaking of American Government (2016); Steven M. Teles, The Rise of 
the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law (2008); Joseph Fishkin 
& David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 915, 951–59 
(2018). Recent scholarship on the history of right-to-work laws, corporate religious liberty, 
and federal communications regulation suggests that some of the foundations of the 
conservative legal movement and its First Amendment–industrial complex began to be 
laid several decades earlier. See supra note 109. 
 112. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, First Amendment Clinic Coming to Vanderbilt Law, 
Concurring Opinions (Jan. 12, 2018), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2018/ 
01/fan-173-2-first-amendment-news-first-amendment-clinic-coming-to-vanderbilt-law-full-time- 
director-sought.html [https://perma.cc/Z98X-TTSH]; Cornell Law School Announces Launch 
of New First Amendment Clinic, Cornell Law Sch. (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.lawschool. 
cornell.edu/spotlights/first-amendment-clinic.cfm [https://perma.cc/S79W-8258]; Powell to 
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charities,” these centers and clinics will not engage in electioneering or 
do any substantial amount of legislative advocacy.113 Instead, they can be 
expected to do what such nonprofits usually do: bring lawsuits seeking 
access to government records or seeking to strike down government 
policies under the Constitution. Even if some of these centers and clinics 
are staffed by liberals who aim to defend the downtrodden,114 the 
proliferation of First Amendment–focused organizations risks further 
exacerbation of “First Amendment expansionism”115 and further 
degradation of the state’s ability to regulate, to better or worse effect, on 
behalf of the public interest.116 
*  *  * 
Against this historical and institutional backdrop, any robust 
response to First Amendment Lochnerism must grapple with the many 
ways in which the First Amendment tends to entrench socioeconomic 
inequality. We have called attention to a set of economic, political, 
technological, and legal developments that, over the past half century, 
have combined to make First Amendment litigation and ideology a field 
of struggle that overwhelmingly favors the interests of large employers 
and well-educated professionals in the private sector (as well as the upper 
echelons of the national security bureaucracy in the public sector, a topic 
we lack the space to address117). Not only does the contemporary First 
                                                                                                                           
Lead New First Amendment Clinic at Duke Law, Duke Law News (Feb. 7, 2018), http:// 
law.duke.edu/news/powell-lead-new-first-amendment-clinic-duke-law [https://perma.cc/V3B2-
6NHJ]; Karen Sung, ASU Law Establishes First Amendment Clinic with Gift from Stanton 
Foundation, Ariz. State Univ. (Dec. 13, 2017), http://campus.asu.edu/content/asu-law-
establishes-first-amendment-clinic-gift-stanton-foundation [https://perma.cc/RXD4-8R9W]. One 
of us (Pozen) served this past year as the inaugural visiting scholar at Columbia University’s 
Knight First Amendment Institute, which was established in 2016. 
 113. The Knight First Amendment Institute, for instance, is organized under section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See Press Release, Knight Found., ACLU’s 
Jameel Jaffer to Direct Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University (June 29, 
2016), http://www.knightfoundation.org/press/releases/aclus-jameel-jaffer-direct-knight-
first-amendment [https://perma.cc/Y5W4-P5PJ]. Accordingly, it may not “participate . . . 
or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate 
for public office” or devote a “substantial part of [its] activities” to “attempting[] to influ-
ence legislation.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 114. See, e.g., G.S. Hans Joins Vanderbilt’s Law Faculty as an Assistant Clinical Profes-
sor of Law, Vanderbilt Law Sch. (Aug. 15, 2018), http://law.vanderbilt.edu/news/gautam-
hans [https://perma.cc/CR5Q-WW7F] (quoting the incoming director of Vanderbilt’s 
new First Amendment clinic as expressing a “particular[] interest[] in representing 
vulnerable populations who may need help in asserting their speech and assembly 
rights”). 
 115. Kendrick, Expansionism, supra note 53, at 1200, 1210–19. 
 116. Cf. infra section IV.A (elaborating further on the risk that “maximalist” First 
Amendment arguments advanced for progressive purposes will ultimately fuel First 
Amendment Lochnerism). 
 117. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s 
Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J. 1, 2 (2009) 
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Amendment landscape give the high ground to those already rich in 
financial and cultural capital, but it also places numerous obstacles in the 
path of wage laborers and undercapitalized social groups—groups whose 
free expression and association might otherwise serve as tools of 
collective self-protection and advancement. 
As this grim appraisal makes clear, the search for an egalitarian First 
Amendment is well and truly a search: an inquiry, both practical and 
theoretical, into the very possibility of a First Amendment jurisprudence 
that would advance the expressive and associational interests of the 
socioeconomically disadvantaged. 
III. THE INADEQUACY OF FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY 
How might this inquiry proceed? A natural place to begin the search 
for a more socioeconomically egalitarian First Amendment—a First 
Amendment that alleviates, or at least does less to aggravate, the “egal-
itarian anxiety” sketched in this Essay’s introduction—is with normative 
theories of free speech.118 The Free Speech Clause itself is notoriously 
unhelpful. Neither its text119 nor its drafting history120 sheds much light 
on contemporary controversies. In the absence of interpretive input 
from such sources, judges and scholars have produced a vast body of writ-
ing that seeks to justify, critique, and shape First Amendment doctrine in 
light of foundational principles and aspirations—above all, the pursuit of 
                                                                                                                           
(explaining that courts assessing public employees’ First Amendment claims “increasingly 
permit government to control its employees’ expression at work, characterizing this 
speech as the government’s own,” and “also increasingly consider government workers to 
be speaking as employees even when away from work”); David E. Pozen, The Leaky 
Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 515 (2013) (explaining that under existing First 
Amendment doctrine “the government has expansive legal authority to prosecute 
employees who leak” national security information to the media). 
 118. Again, this Essay, like the Symposium of which it is a part, focuses on questions of 
free expression to the neglect of other aspects of First Amendment law. See supra note 46. 
 119. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Yet hardly anyone reads the Amendment to 
apply only to Congress, and since the early twentieth century “principles of free 
expression have taken hold in a way that has become detached from—and may never have 
been all that securely connected to—the words of the First Amendment.” David A. Strauss, 
The Supreme Court, 2014 Term—Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 
129 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34 (2015). 
 120. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 9 (4th ed. 2014) 
(“Unfortunately, the incomplete materials concerning the legislative history of the 
Amendment shed little light about just what was meant by freedom of speech and of the 
press.”); Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting 
Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 Const. Comment. 43, 53 (2007) (stating that 
“most scholars agree” that “the original meaning of the First Amendment . . . is—at best—
indeterminate or unhelpful”); cf. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) (“The framers seem to have had no 
coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have been overly concerned with the 
subject.”). 
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truth, the promotion of individual autonomy, and the facilitation of dem-
ocratic self-government.121 The canonical theories of free speech, one 
might assume, should help us get some purchase on the egalitarian anxi-
ety, whether by suggesting ways in which the inegalitarian aspects of First 
Amendment law might be challenged and alternative doctrines devel-
oped, or by supplying reasons why this body of law’s subordination of 
substantive equality interests to negative liberty interests is defensible or 
maybe even unavoidable. 
A. Truth, Autonomy, Democracy . . . and Equality? 
In point of fact, however, the leading theories of the First Amendment 
prove indecisive when confronted by the egalitarian anxiety. Democratic 
theorizing about free speech may seem at first glance to offer the most 
hospitable terrain for egalitarian projects and autonomy theorizing the 
least, insofar as the former prioritizes communal goods while the latter 
prioritizes individualistic ideals. And indeed, First Amendment theorists 
who emphasize democratic deliberation and decisionmaking have been 
more likely, on balance, to take socioeconomic inequalities into account. 
Yet none of the leading theories of free speech has been able to generate 
clear or consistent guidance about how such inequalities ought to bear 
on constitutional analysis, for several reasons. 
First, truth-seeking, autonomy-promoting, and democracy-facilitat-
ing accounts of free speech (as well as related accounts that focus on tol-
erance, dissent, and so on) tend to be formulated in highly abstract and 
depoliticized terms. This allows them to apply to a wide range of situations 
and to appeal to a wide range of groups—no one is “against” truth, self-
actualization, or self-government—but also to be invoked by very differ-
ent jurists in support of very different outcomes.122 Alexander Meiklejohn’s 
democratic theory of free speech, for example, has been “embraced all 
along the political spectrum, from Robert Bork to William Brennan,”123 
and deployed to defend both exceptionally narrow conceptions of First 
                                                                                                                           
 121. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, First Amendment Cosmopolitanism, Skepticism, and 
Democracy, 76 Ohio St. L.J. 705, 714 (2015) (describing these as “the principal American 
First Amendment free speech theories or justifications”); see also Yotam Barkai, Note, The 
Child Paradox in First Amendment Doctrine, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1414, 1429 n.90 (2012) 
(“Because the text is inherently unhelpful and the original understanding of free speech 
has limited utility, judges and scholars have generally referred to these three theories 
[advancing truth, facilitating democratic self-government, and promoting autonomy, self-
fulfillment, and self-realization] in analyzing First Amendment problems.”). 
 122. Cf. Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life 
Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819, 1826–41 (2016) (explaining why 
“depoliticized” legal theories are especially susceptible to co-optation and reformulation 
over time). 
 123. Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 2 (1996). 
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Amendment review124 and expansive proposals for the redistribution of 
speech rights.125 Moreover, it is now widely appreciated that the pursuit 
of truth, the promotion of individual autonomy, and the facilitation of 
democratic self-government are best understood as partial and overlap-
ping—rather than comprehensive or mutually exclusive—theories of free 
speech,126 which creates additional play in the normative joints. 
Second, the indeterminacy of abstract First Amendment theories is 
compounded by empirical uncertainty about the real-world effects of 
different speech arrangements. All the leading theories assume a certain 
causal relationship between speech rules and social outcomes. They posit 
that expressive practices, when structured appropriately, can generate 
more knowledge, better debate, greater self-realization, or the like. For 
the most part, however, these claims are not grounded in any well-
worked-out social theory, and good evidence of the validity of the 
assumed causal relationships is sparse to nonexistent. Although it has 
long been asserted, for instance, that an “open marketplace of ideas” is 
more likely to distinguish truth from falsity than a regime based on epis-
temic paternalism, in which authorities categorize ideas as true or false, 
the existing empirical research offers little support for this assertion.127 
Empirical results on the impact of various antitrust and media regula-
tions on the diversity of ideas “have been similarly mixed.”128 The relevant 
                                                                                                                           
 124. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 120, at 20 (arguing on “democratic” grounds that First 
Amendment “protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political” and 
not to “any other form of expression”). 
 125. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405, 
1415 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Social Structure] (arguing that a “commitment to rich 
public debate will allow[] and sometimes even require the state” to adopt policies that 
“make certain all views are heard,” however “repressive” such policies “might at first 
seem”). 
 126. See Farber, supra note 120, at 8–10; Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and 
Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1212, 1283 (1983); Lawrence B. Solum, The Value of Dissent, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 859, 
859–60 (2000). 
 127. See Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1160, 1163 (2015) (“[A] considerable amount of existing empirical 
research . . . tends . . . to justify skepticism about the causal efficacy of establishing an open 
marketplace of ideas in identifying true propositions and rejecting false ones.”); cf. 
Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 897, 910–11 (2010) 
(“[T]he persistence of the belief that a good remedy for false speech is more speech, or 
that truth will prevail in the long run, may itself be an example of the resistance of false 
factual propositions to argument and counterexample.”). As Vincent Blasi has explained, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in introducing the market metaphor, did not intend to 
endorse the pursuit of truth as the overriding aim of free speech or neutral proceduralism 
as a model of regulation. See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 39–40 (“[O]ne must appreciate how far [Holmes] was from a modern 
procedural liberal concerned more about the right than the good . . . . The cultural/ 
intellectual/political combat facilitated by free speech is, in Holmes’s vision, messy, 
unpredictable, often nasty, and impossible to domesticate.”). 
 128. Ho & Schauer, supra note 127, at 1165 n.16. 
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dependent variables (truth, democratic discourse, personal autonomy) 
are hard to specify and to measure, and they may be influenced by 
countless factors apart from formal speech rules. When it comes to the 
central prescriptive dilemma raised by the egalitarian anxiety—the 
degree to which its alleviation requires government planning—the 
leading theories of free speech therefore have less to offer than one 
might expect. 
Finally, truth-seeking, autonomy-promoting, and democracy-facilitat-
ing theories of free speech are ambiguously positioned vis-à-vis the 
egalitarian anxiety because while none of these theories foregrounds 
“equality” as a desideratum, none rejects it either. For example, the 
preeminent autonomy advocate Professor Martin Redish is happy to 
concede that equality is “an important element of free speech theory,” as 
“[t]he equality principle has a long and venerable tradition in First 
Amendment theory and doctrine.”129 The equality principle that Redish 
has in mind, however, is a version of viewpoint neutrality: the proposition 
that “[a]ll viewpoints must have an equal opportunity to compete in the 
intellectual marketplace, free from selective governmental regulation.”130 
Explicitly rejected are other versions of an equality principle, more in 
tune with the concerns of this Symposium, that might entail “increasing 
the pre-speech resources of the economically inferior speakers or limit-
ing the economically superior speakers’ ability to employ their resources 
for expressive purposes.”131 As Redish’s discussion reflects, equality claims 
are made by free speech theorists of all stripes and on both sides of the 
same questions. Accordingly, debates over whether and how free speech 
law should respond to present inequalities are prone to take place within 
an already capacious, ill-defined, and internally riven egalitarian tradition 
of First Amendment theorizing. 
B. The Example of Campaign Finance Regulation 
Perhaps no area better illustrates the inadequacy of high-level First 
Amendment theory for negotiating the egalitarian anxiety than campaign 
finance law. Cases such as Citizens United v. FEC 132 and McCutcheon v. FEC 133 
have been at the heart of the emerging critique of First Amendment 
Lochnerism. They raise the question whether the Free Speech Clause 
permits a legislature to limit the election-related spending of corporations, 
                                                                                                                           
 129. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: 
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235, 282 
(1998). A generation earlier, Professor Kenneth Karst argued influentially that the “principle 
of equal liberty of expression underlies” each of the three major theories of the First 
Amendment. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 20, 23 (1975). 
 130. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 129, at 283. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 133. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
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unions, or wealthy individuals in the service of antiplutocratic goals. To 
help answer this question in the face of mixed precedent and negligible 
Founding-era evidence, the Justices have adverted to each of the three 
major normative theories of the First Amendment. 
Writing for the Court in Citizens United, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
contended that the restrictions on corporate “electioneering communi-
cations” imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002134 
(BCRA) were simultaneously undermining the pursuit of truth, individ-
ual autonomy, and democratic deliberation, as corporate speech contrib-
utes importantly to all of these values. According to Kennedy, such 
restrictions “interfere[] with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected 
by the First Amendment”;135 impair “the freedom to think for ourselves”;136 
“deprive[] the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to 
strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice”;137 
and distort “an essential mechanism of democracy” and “enlightened 
self-government.”138 Various amici on the side of Citizens United appealed 
similarly to truth, autonomy, and democracy.139 Justice Kennedy further 
contended that the design of BCRA reflected an impermissible 
government preference for certain categories of speakers (natural 
persons) over others (corporations and unions).140 As Professor Genevieve 
Lakier observes in her essay for this Symposium, the majority opinion 
aggressively claimed the mantle of egalitarianism.141 It just adopted a 
highly formalistic, anticlassificationist conception of expressive equality, 
                                                                                                                           
 134. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441b (2012)). 
 135. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez 
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)). 
 136. Id. at 356. 
 137. Id. at 340–41. 
 138. Id. at 339; see also id. at 360 (asserting that any appearance of special political 
“influence or access” for corporate speakers “will not cause the electorate to lose faith in 
our democracy”). 
 139. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of 
Appellant on Supplemental Question at 11–17, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 
2009 WL 2349017 (citing “the pursuit of truth,” “responsive democratic government,” and 
the “values of self-realization, personal and cultural development, autonomy, and 
autonomous decision-making” as reasons to strike down limitations on corporate 
electioneering). 
 140. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (“We find no basis for the proposition 
that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain 
disfavored speakers.”); cf. Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 Ga. St. U. L. 
Rev. 935, 940 (2011) (describing the Citizens United Court as taking “steps to dismantle the 
First Amendment ‘caste system’ whereby whether someone or some group could speak 
depended on who or what they were”). 
 141. See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 
Colum. L. Rev. 2117, 2130–31 (2018). 
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similar to Redish’s notion of equality as freedom from “selective 
governmental regulation.”142 
Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Citizens United, 
meanwhile, argued just as vigorously that BCRA’s restrictions on 
corporate electioneering enhanced the pursuit of truth, individual 
autonomy, and democratic deliberation. These restrictions, in Stevens’s 
telling, did not impinge upon anyone’s autonomy or self-expression, and 
on the contrary they reduced the risk that a “corporation’s electoral 
message” would “conflict with the[] personal convictions” of the individ-
uals associated with the corporation.143 At the same time, these restrictions 
reduced the risk that corporations would “distort public debate” and 
stymie the search for truth by “cow[ing]” politicians “into silence,” 
“drowning out . . . noncorporate voices,” and “dimish[ing] citizens’ 
willingness and capacity to participate in the democratic process.”144 These 
arguments, too, were familiar from the First Amendment literature. 
Nearly three decades earlier, Judge Skelly Wright sought to show that “all 
of the leading first amendment rationales may be comfortably reconciled 
with campaign spending reforms,” because regulation that limits 
spending by wealthy interests “enhances the self-expression of individual 
citizens who lack wealth,” preserves “the truth-producing capacity of the 
marketplace of ideas,” and “prevent[s] mutilation of . . . communal 
thought processes.”145 Like Judge Wright before him, Justice Stevens 
connected these claims to a substantive and, in Lakier’s terms, 
antisubordinating vision of expressive and political equality.146 
Both the majority and the dissent in Citizens United thus plausibly 
invoked each and every one of the three major First Amendment 
theories, as well as the value of equality itself, in support of their dueling 
positions. The result is a vivid demonstration of how the abstraction and 
depoliticization, lack of empirical grounding, and underspecified 
embrace of equality that characterize these theories sap them of the 
power to sharpen, let alone resolve, the most controversial questions at 
the intersection of free speech and political economy. Grand theorizing 
about truth, autonomy, and democracy fails to supply meaningful 
direction to those seeking a more egalitarian First Amendment. Instead, 
                                                                                                                           
 142. Redish & Wasserman, supra note 129, at 283. 
 143. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 467 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (emphasis omitted). 
 144. Id. at 469–72. 
 145. J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an 
Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 636–39 (1982). 
 146. Lakier, supra note 141, at 2123–27. Justice Stevens did not defend this equality value 
by name, relying instead on the language of “anticorruption” and “antidistortion” from 
the Court’s earlier opinions. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447–75 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part); cf. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned 
Antidistortion Rationale, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 989, 992–1000 (2011) (noting doctrinal and 
case-specific reasons Justice Stevens may not have felt “comfortable embracing the political 
equality rationale fully” and explicitly in his dissent). 
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those who wish to reverse or offset First Amendment Lochnerism tend to 
pursue a set of midlevel conceptual and jurisprudential moves suggested 
by the contemporary legal landscape. We turn next to these moves and 
the grammar of free speech egalitarianism they have created. 
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT EGALITARIANISM: A CRITICAL ROADMAP 
To appreciate more fully the institutional, ideological, and doctrinal 
challenges that egalitarian reformers face today, it is helpful to imagine 
the mirror image of First Amendment Lochnerism—that is, the mirror 
image of judicial enforcement of negative rights against state action in an 
ostensibly neutral, yet materially inegalitarian, manner. The mirror 
image of such a regime would look something like early twentieth-
century progressive civil libertarianism, updated for the information age. 
As discussed in section I.B, progressive civil libertarians turned to 
administrative agencies and sympathetic legislators, rather than courts, to 
protect workers, political dissenters, and vulnerable minorities from the 
dominance of private employers, bigoted local governments, and 
conservative blocs within the national government. Motivating this 
project was not an apolitical belief in formal equality or fair play but a 
partisan commitment to the creation of a more inclusive, economically 
just society. Newly created agencies such as the NLRB, the FCC, and the 
Civil Liberties Unit of DOJ saw it as an important part of their mission to 
redistribute expressive and associational rights to undercapitalized 
groups. 
The regulatory approach taken by these New Deal institutions now 
seems “off the wall,”147 and not merely because of recent First Amendment 
Lochnerism. When the liberal compromise displaced progressive civil 
libertarianism in the second half of the twentieth century,148 it ruled out 
precisely the kind of civil libertarian activities in which agencies like the 
NLRB used to engage. Between its founding in 1935 and 1940, NLRB 
administrators openly favored the organizing efforts of those unions they 
thought most politically progressive and ethnically diverse (and most 
supportive of the New Deal); they scrutinized the speech and assembly of 
employees opposed to unionization for interference with the goals of 
federal labor law; and they vigorously investigated and sanctioned 
employers who expressed anti-union views or issued misleading descrip-
tions of labor law.149 Such employer speech, the NLRB reasoned, was not 
                                                                                                                           
 147. See Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge 
Went Mainstream, Atlantic (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/ 
2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040 
[https://perma.cc/T449-4S97] (“Off-the-wall arguments are those most well-trained lawyers 
think are clearly wrong . . . .”). 
 148. See supra section I.B. 
 149. See Weinrib, Liberal Compromise, supra note 68, at 468–96 (describing the 
NLRB’s activities in this period and the cleavage its suppression of employer speech 
produced within the nongovernmental civil libertarian community); see also Peter H. 
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speech at all within the meaning of the First Amendment.150 Rather, 
interpreted in the context of the power that employers wield over 
employees’ wages and work conditions, the expression of opposition to 
unionization by owners and managers constituted a form of coercion.151 
The NLRB’s suppression of employer speech in the name of the civil 
liberties of workers went so far as to lead the Board to subpoena local 
newspaper editors to determine whether their publication of anti-
union—or anti-NLRB—statements had been sought by employers 
engaged in nearby labor disputes.152 
Through the lens of the liberal compromise, the early NLRB’s 
insistent rejection of neutrality when it came to the regulation of 
expression and association looks shocking, as do the sheer scope and zeal 
of its investigations into anti-union speech, both inside and outside the 
workplace. Government viewpoint (and, to a lesser extent, content) 
neutrality is a “bedrock principle” of modern First Amendment law.153 
The partisan provision of expressive and associational rights by the 
political branches to make up for disparities in socioeconomic power 
among private parties inverts the contemporary paradigm: judicial 
enforcement of such rights against state interference, above all when that 
interference seems motivated by a preference for certain classes of 
speakers or ideas. 
While each feature of this paradigm has been the target of 
egalitarian critique or qualification, very few commentators have called 
for its wholesale abandonment. Especially now, in the midst of the 
Trump presidency, elements of the liberal compromise such as judicial 
supremacy, content and viewpoint neutrality, and the state action 
doctrine strike many on the left as salutary limits on the degree to which 
ascendant political movements can dominate civil society. Unfortunately 
for egalitarians, these elements also stand in the way of building a 
progressive civil libertarian state. Such a state would curtail judicial 
review, reject the ideal of formal neutrality when it comes to the 
regulation of certain categories of expression and association, and 
                                                                                                                           
Irons, The New Deal Lawyers 226–71 (1982) (providing a detailed account of the NLRB’s 
early administrative practices); Kessler, Administrative Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 751–54 
(discussing political and legal critiques of the NLRB’s progressive civil libertarianism in 
the late 1930s). 
 150. See Joseph K. Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 25 Md. L. Rev. 111, 112–13 (1965); Kate E. Andrias, Note, A Robust Public 
Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace Representation Elections, 112 Yale L.J. 2415, 
2422–24 (2003) [hereinafter Andrias, Robust Public Debate]. 
 151. See, e.g., 3 NLRB Ann. Rep. 59–62, 125 (1938); 2 NLRB Ann. Rep. 65–66 (1937); 
1 NLRB Ann. Rep. 73–74 (1936). 
 152. See Weinrib, Liberal Compromise, supra note 68, at 441–45. 
 153. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 
695, 695 (2011); see also, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) 
(“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”). 
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impose speech-redistributive obligations on particularly powerful private 
entities. To the extent that these modes of governance are seen by 
mainstream legal and political actors as incompatible with a free 
democratic society, the strongest historical alternative to First Amendment 
Lochnerism—progressive civil libertarianism—will remain off the wall 
and off the table. 
As a result, today’s progressives generally struggle to achieve a more 
egalitarian First Amendment within the doctrinal and rhetorical 
boundaries of the liberal compromise. In this Part, we outline the basic 
motifs—the transsubstantive themes, tropes, and fault lines—of First 
Amendment egalitarian argument. Drawing on both the Symposium 
essays and outside writings, we identify three such motifs that recur again 
and again in the literature. Together, these motifs constitute something 
like a grammar of First Amendment egalitarianism.154 We make no claim 
to comprehensiveness or taxonomic rigor. There may in fact be two basic 
motifs, or ten. The grammar will undoubtedly change over time in 
response to the success or failure of particular ideas; it will also likely fea-
ture a host of overlaps and other internal ambiguities, the resolution of 
which may prove unnecessary, impossible, or, alternatively, transforma-
tive.155 The goal of this Part is not to arbitrate among competing camps 
but to clarify the structure of contemporary First Amendment debate and 
to give some sense of the argumentative resources—and the limitations of 
the resources—available to critics of First Amendment Lochnerism. 
A. Minimalism Versus Maximalism 
Before they can arrive at any particular reform proposal, the 
threshold question that confronts, and divides, critics of First 
Amendment Lochnerism is how powerful they want the judicially enforced 
First Amendment to be. This question itself has several dimensions. 
Reformers might seek to expand or contract the scope of the First 
Amendment’s “coverage,” or the amount of communicative activity that 
is subject to First Amendment scrutiny.156 For any given category of 
                                                                                                                           
 154. For this metaphorical usage of “grammar,” see Grammar, Merriam-Webster, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/grammar [https://perma.cc/9BVJ-D7EN] (last 
visited July 21, 2018) (defining “grammar” as, inter alia, “the principles or rules of an art, 
science, or technique,” as in “a grammar of the theater”). For the canonical discussion of 
this usage, see Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, at xix (Univ. of Cal. Press 1969) 
(1945) (defining a grammar as the “formal interrelationships [that] prevail” among a 
given set of “terms . . . by reason of their role as attributes of a common ground or 
substance”); id. at 441 (defining a grammar as “an attitude embodied in a method”). 
 155. See Burke, supra note 154, at xix (emphasizing the need “to study and clarify the 
resources of ambiguity” within a grammar, as “it is in the areas of ambiguity that transfor-
mations take place; in fact, without such areas, transformation would be impossible”). 
 156. See Amanda Shanor, First Amendment Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 318, 325 
(2018) (“Coverage is a sociological concept: It is not the theoretical or philosophical scope 
of the right of free speech, but what litigants and courts in a given historical moment view as 
within, or plausibly within, the scope of that right.”); see also Frederick Schauer, The 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249794 
2018] AN EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT 1987 
 
covered speech, they might seek to invigorate or enervate this scrutiny 
and the First Amendment “protection” that the category receives.157 And 
whatever their views on coverage and protection, reformers might seek to 
allocate more or less of this enforcement work to the courts. The 
overarching issue is whether and to what extent the project of creating a 
more socially and economically egalitarian public sphere should be 
pursued within or outside judicial enforcement of the First Amendment. 
As free speech law has drifted rightward in recent years, many 
progressives have become less concerned to get First Amendment 
doctrine just right than to get it out of the way. No fewer than four 
contributions to this Symposium appeal to such First Amendment 
minimalism. After critiquing the neoliberal assumptions that animate the 
Roberts Court’s free speech rulings, Professor Jedediah Purdy calls for a 
“jurisprudence of permission” that would enable legislatures to pursue 
social democratic aims without running afoul of the First Amendment.158 
Professor Jack Balkin warns against applying the First Amendment to 
social media platforms, and he urges courts to reject free speech 
challenges brought by these platforms to “technical, regulatory, and 
administrative” measures that would enhance end users’ “practical 
freedom,” such as net neutrality rules and media concentration limits.159 
Both Professor Leslie Kendrick and Professor Louis Michael Seidman 
suggest that First Amendment law is not simply ill equipped to drive 
progressive change, but incapable of doing so.160 For all these authors, 
judicial enforcement of First Amendment rights will not lead to a more 
egalitarian state or society; the best that can be hoped for is to contain 
the damage. 
                                                                                                                           
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 
117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1769–807 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, Boundaries] (exploring 
possible political, cultural, and economic determinants of First Amendment coverage). 
 157. The distinction between First Amendment coverage and protection is Professor 
Frederick Schauer’s. See Mark Tushnet, The Coverage/Protection Distinction in the Law of 
Freedom of Speech—An Essay on Meta-Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 25 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 1073, 1075 & n.13 (2017) (discussing the origins of the distinction). For a 
particularly recent and concise restatement, see Frederick Schauer, Response, Out of 
Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 346, 347–48 (2015), http:// 
harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/vol128_Schauer.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3MNZ-HSAP]. 
 158. Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class 
Entrenchment, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2161, 2175–81 (2018); cf. Tim Wu, Knight First Amendment 
Inst., Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 19 (2017) [hereinafter Wu, Obsolete], http:// 
knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/content/Emerging%20Threats%20Tim%20Wu%20Is%
20the%20First%20Amendment%20Obsolete.pdf [https://perma.cc/YWN6-FSYJ] (“[T]he project 
of realizing a healthier speech environment may depend more on what the First Amendment 
permits, rather than what it prevents or requires.”). 
 159. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2011, 2032–33 (2018) 
[hereinafter Balkin, Triangle]. 
 160. See generally Leslie Kendrick, Another First Amendment, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 
2095 (2018); Louis Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118 Colum. L. 
Rev. 2219 (2018). 
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The slow but steady growth in judicial coverage and protection of 
commercial speech, computer algorithms, and campaign spending161 
would seem to support the view that even when First Amendment norms 
are crafted with the most egalitarian of intentions,162 they tend to repro-
duce or intensify the inequalities inherent in a legal system wedded to 
the production, exchange, and accumulation of commodities.163 Min-
imalist responses, accordingly, aim to limit the scope of First Amendment 
coverage (as with the argument that algorithms should not be considered 
“speech”164), to limit the degree of First Amendment protection (as with the 
argument that regulations of commercial speech should be subject to less 
demanding scrutiny165), or to avoid legal moves that could inadvertently 
invigorate the First Amendment in the future.166 With the First Amendment 
thus chastened, legislators and administrators could pursue a broader set 
of egalitarian projects. Of course, this gain in freedom to regulate would 
                                                                                                                           
 161. See Kendrick, Expansionism, supra note 53, at 1200 (discussing “First Amendment 
expansionism, where the First Amendment’s territory pushes outward to encompass ever 
more areas of law”); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in Eternally 
Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era 174, 176 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone 
eds., 2002) (discussing “First Amendment opportunism,” whereby free speech doctrine 
and rhetoric are asked to serve ends external to “the purposes the First Amendment was 
designed to serve”). 
 162. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 763 (1976) (justifying the extension of First Amendment coverage to include 
commercial advertising on the ground that a pharmacy’s generic drug ads would help “the 
poor, the sick, and particularly the aged” procure medicines at the lowest price). 
 163. For the commodity-form theory of law, see generally Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Law 
and Marxism: A General Theory (Barbara Einhorn trans., Ink Links Ltd. 1989) (1924). 
For a perceptive summary of Pashukanis’s thought, see China Miéville, The Commodity-
Form Theory of International Law, in International Law on the Left: Re-examining 
Marxist Legacies 92, 105–20 (Susan Marks ed., 2008). 
 164. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 
52 UCLA L. Rev. 1149, 1169 (2005) (“I believe that most privacy regulation that interrupts 
information flows in the context of an express or implied commercial relationship is 
neither ‘speech’ within the current meaning of the First Amendment, nor should it be 
viewed as such.” (footnotes omitted)); Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. Times 
(June 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/free-speech-for-computers.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[A]s a general rule, nonhuman or automated 
choices should not be granted the full protection of the First Amendment, and often 
should not be considered ‘speech’ at all.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 
Cardozo L. Rev. 2583, 2584 (2008) (critiquing the trend “to offer broader protection to 
commercial speech and corporate speakers than has been extended in the past”); Robert 
Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 165, 174 
(2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/vol128_PostShanor2.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3ZJQ-JA55] (criticizing contemporary courts for reviewing regulations of commercial 
speech in an “aimlessly intrusive” manner). 
 166. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s Constitution, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 1591, 1593–
95 (2016) [hereinafter Andrias, Labor’s Constitution] (describing and defending “the 
choice of worker movements not to lay claim to the Constitution” and noting labor lawyers’ 
fear that “even when workers direct their constitutional claims to elected officials, courts 
often end up reviewing—and rejecting—their validity”). 
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likely come at the expense of some valuable expression. For progressive 
minimalists, however, that tradeoff might well seem worth it, especially to 
the extent that judicial enforcement of the First Amendment fails to protect 
truly transformative or transgressive speech, as opposed to speech that 
poses little threat to legal elites or the socioeconomic status quo.167 
This tradeoff will seem especially worthwhile in periods when the 
legislative and executive branches are led by progressives. The United 
States is, to put it mildly, not in such a period right now. Yet First 
Amendment minimalism need not entail a belief that the legislative and 
executive branches, simply as a matter of constitutional structure, are 
more likely than courts to produce egalitarian outcomes under all social 
conditions. Progressive civil libertarians in the first half of the twentieth 
century not only sought to free the political branches from the negative 
constraint of judicial supervision; they also sought to impose on the 
political branches both new institutional forms and a specific ideological 
mission—oriented around values such as democratic pluralism and 
individual self-determination—through the operation of a mass political 
party committed to that mission and capable of sustaining institutional 
innovation.168 Similarly, nothing prevents contemporary First Amendment 
minimalists from seeking to coordinate their civil libertarian vision with 
the practical pursuit of political power. 
Despite the appeals of minimalism, achieving any significant roll-
back of First Amendment doctrine looks like an uphill battle given the 
rise of informational capitalism in the marketplace, the First Amendment–
industrial complex in civil society, and First Amendment Lochnerism in the 
courts.169 Whether out of conviction or in capitulation, many contemporary 
                                                                                                                           
 167. As Professor Michael Klarman has observed: 
A cynical, though nonetheless apparently accurate, interpretation of the 
Court’s free speech jurisprudence is that political dissidents become 
entitled to significant constitutional protection only when they cease to 
pose a serious threat to the status quo—that is, communists and Ku 
Kluxers in the second half of the 1960s, but not, respectively, in the 
1950s or 1920s. Further, according to this interpretation, the Court 
protects the expression rights of pesky but nonthreatening dissidents 
(Jehovah’s Witnesses) and of mainstream speakers (labor union 
picketers in 1940 but not 1920). Precious little corroboration of the 
Court’s countermajoritarian heroics appears in the free speech context. 
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. 
Rev. 1, 14–15 (1996) (footnote omitted); cf. Andrias, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 166, 
at 1609–11 (observing, with reference to First Amendment doctrine, that “the history of 
court antagonism toward workers is particularly long and storied”). 
 168. On the relationship between New Deal administration and the mass party, see 
Kessler, Administrative Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 731–34. On the relationship between 
progressive civil libertarianism and democracy, see Kessler, Administrative Origins, supra 
note 57, at 1084–92. 
 169. See supra Part II; see also Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 156, at 1789–90 (discussing 
“the First Amendment’s magnetism,” its “rhetorical power and argumentative authority,” in 
contemporary U.S. political culture); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First 
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progressives have offered more maximalist arguments that seek to extend 
First Amendment coverage to, or enhance First Amendment protection 
of, equality-promoting expressive and associational activities that are 
slighted by existing doctrine. In this spirit, Professor Bertrall Ross argues 
in his contribution to this Symposium that courts should not only 
embrace First Amendment claims against partisan gerrymandering—
claims that have been rapidly gaining traction, especially on the left170—
but also do so in a manner that prioritizes the associational interests of 
“political outsiders.”171 Going more against the grain of current case law, 
Professor Catherine Fisk argues in her Symposium essay for substantially 
greater First Amendment protection for labor picketing and boycotts.172 
Not represented in this Symposium are a host of other maximalist 
arguments put forward in recent years that seek to enhance social or 
economic equality in parts of the expressive landscape. Examples include 
proposals for recognizing or strengthening First Amendment rights: 
• to register to vote and to cast a ballot;173 
• to access government information and facilities (a “right to 
know”);174 
                                                                                                                           
Amendment Coverage, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1613, 1614–17 (2015) (cataloguing 
“accelerating attempt[s]” in recent years “to widen the scope of First Amendment coverage”). 
 170. This development itself reflects a remarkable expansion of First Amendment 
(and contraction of equal protection) advocacy. Cf. Richard Pildes, What Is the First 
Amendment Theory of Partisan Gerrymandering?, Election Law Blog (Mar. 25, 2018), 
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=98319 [https://perma.cc/J9XF-4D7Y] (noting that until 
very recently, “references to the First Amendment ha[d] sometimes been thrown in” to 
equal protection challenges to partisan gerrymandering “but never developed in a full 
way”). For the most recent judicial statement of support, authored by Justice Elena Kagan 
and joined by all three of her liberal colleagues, see Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 
(2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[P]artisan gerrymanders may infringe the First Amendment 
rights of association held by parties, other political organizations, and their members.”). 
 171. Bertrall Ross, Partisan Gerrymandering, the First Amendment, and the Political 
Outsider, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2187, 2190–94 (2018). 
 172. Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as 
Prologue, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2057, 2076–91 (2018); see also Andrias, Labor’s Constitution, 
supra note 166, at 1600 & n.46 (collecting recent sources arguing that the Court should 
“interpret the First Amendment’s speech and assembly clauses to give employees greater 
rights in organizing campaigns, boycotts, and strikes”). 
 173. See, e.g., Armand Derfner & J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34 Yale L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 471, 472 (2016) (“This Essay . . . proposes that we find a source of constitutional 
protection for voting in the First Amendment.”); Janai S. Nelson, The First Amendment, 
Equal Protection, and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 111, 
115–16, 141–59 (2013) (advancing a “First Amendment Equal Protection” framework for 
strengthening the right to vote and challenging felon disenfranchisement laws); cf. 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 424–25 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Under the majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment 
problem that corporations are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other 
things, a form of speech.”). 
 174. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: 
Considering the Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 95, 
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• to record the police and other officials performing public duties (a 
“right to record”),175 as well as private parties engaged in matters 
of public concern;176 
• to exercise expressive and religious liberties outside the borders 
of the United States;177 
• to feed homeless people;178 
• to engage in panhandling;179 
• to access, use, reproduce, and exchange copyrighted or otherwise 
privately owned information;180 
                                                                                                                           
130–34 (2004) (arguing for First Amendment access rights to administrative proceedings); 
Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and the 
People’s Elusive “Right to Know,” 72 Md. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2012) (criticizing courts’ “failure to 
acknowledge that the First Amendment ‘right to know’ is a foundational value of our form 
of government . . . and the key to interpreting [the Freedom of Information Act]”); see 
also Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1025, 1031 (2011) 
(urging an “interpretation of the Press Clause . . . that would allow journalists additional 
and unique protections, primarily with respect to newsgathering”). Outside the context of 
criminal trials, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), efforts to 
convince courts to recognize a First Amendment right of access have thus far been 
“overwhelmingly unsuccessful,” Frederick Schauer, Positive Rights, Negative Rights, and 
the Right to Know, in Troubling Transparency: The History and Future of Freedom of 
Information 34, 37–38 (David E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., 2018). 
 175. See Howard M. Wasserman, Police Misconduct, Video Recording, and Procedural 
Barriers to Rights Enforcement, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 1313, 1337–41 (2018) (reviewing 
“scholarly arguments in support of the First Amendment right to record”). At this writing, 
a half-dozen federal appellate courts recognize some version of a First Amendment right 
to record public officials. See id. at 1336. 
 176. See, e.g., Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the 
Video Age, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 991, 1026–62 (2016) (arguing that the First Amendment 
should be read to confer a limited privilege to engage in nonconsensual audiovisual 
recording on private property when the matters recorded are of public concern). 
 177. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: 
Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 941, 1020 (2011) (criticizing 
“First Amendment parochialism” and advocating a “cosmopolitan” approach that would 
make First Amendment rights “generally portable with regard to citizens, and at least 
partially portable with regard to aliens”). 
 178. See, e.g., Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 16-
16808, 2018 WL 4000057, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 22, 2018) (holding that a nonprofit 
organization’s “outdoor food sharing” with homeless individuals “is expressive conduct 
protected by the First Amendment”). 
 179. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, ACLU Targets Panhandling Laws Across the Nation, 
Concurring Opinions (Aug. 29, 2018), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2018/ 
08 /fan-199-7-first-amendment-news-aclu-targets-panhandling-laws-across-the-nation.html 
[https://perma.cc/L9WA-RM84] (collecting sources on the ACLU’s “all out assault on 
panhandling laws”). 
 180. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 412–46 (1999) 
(arguing that laws that lead to “enclosure” of the public domain, such as the anticircum-
vention provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, raise severe First Amendment 
concerns); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 
Yale L.J. 1, 5 (2002) (arguing that the “freedom of imagination” guaranteed by the First 
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• to speak and associate about lawful subjects with organizations 
designated as terroristic;181 
• for journalists to withhold confidential information from or 
about their sources;182 
• for executive branch employees to “leak” classified information 
suggesting government error or abuse;183 
• to assemble peaceably in public spaces;184 and 
• to be free from state surveillance.185 
This is by no means a complete list. If they were to succeed (or 
succeed to a greater extent than they already have) in the courts, these 
sorts of arguments would not dispel the specter of First Amendment 
Lochnerism; past trends suggest that the First Amendment’s deregulatory 
potential would only grow. But the political valence of First Amendment 
case law might begin to tack back toward the left. 
Conscious of such tradeoffs, progressive maximalists generally 
advance arguments for careful, and highly selective, expansion of the 
First Amendment’s reach. The risk of libertarian co-optation and 
ideological drift hangs over these efforts.186 If a present inequality could 
                                                                                                                           
Amendment “calls into question the enormous and growing set of prohibitions imposed 
by modern copyright law on so-called ‘derivative’ works”). 
 181. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 41 (2010) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment forbids the application of a federal statute 
criminalizing the provision of “material support” to designated foreign terrorist organiza-
tions to “coordinated teaching and advocacy furthering the designated organizations’ lawful 
political objectives”). 
 182. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, The Underprivileged Profession: The Case 
for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 201, 203 
(2005) (“[J]ournalists should have a privilege, grounded in the common law and derived 
from the First Amendment, to refuse to answer subpoenas issued by judicial authorities.”). 
 183. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating 
First Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. Nat’l Security L. & 
Pol’y 409, 411 (2013) (“This article argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, leakers 
merit robust First Amendment protections against prosecution.”). 
 184. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 
543, 586–89 (2009) (critiquing the turn toward requiring prior permission for such 
assemblies and arguing “that the right of assembly should not be collapsed into the right 
of free expression”); John Inazu, Unlawful Assembly as Social Control, 64 UCLA L. Rev. 2, 
8 (2017) (arguing that courts and scholars have “erroneously” limited the right of 
assembly “to purposes of petitioning the government” and ignored First Amendment 
“principles meant to constrain discretionary enforcement by public authorities”). 
 185. See, e.g., Alex Abdo, Why Rely on the Fourth Amendment to Do the Work of the 
First?, 127 Yale L.J. Forum 444, 455 (2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Abdo_ 
5czbvbj9.pdf [https://perma.cc/65EU-E7S5] (suggesting that “[c]ourts could simply apply 
the First Amendment . . . to surveillance that substantially burdens free speech and 
dissent”); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 387, 431–34 (2008) 
(arguing that government surveillance of confidential communications jeopardizes the 
First Amendment value of “intellectual privacy”). 
 186. Rather than seek to carve out certain categories of speech from First Amendment 
coverage or protection, as a minimalist might do, some of today’s progressive maximalists 
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actually be rectified through maximalist litigation, however, the normative 
cost of allowing it to persist may seem too steep. 
The arguments just reviewed generally take as a given the existing 
state action doctrine, pursuant to which the First Amendment, like other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, applies 
almost exclusively to government actors.187 As nongovernmental entities 
such as Facebook and Google have come to dominate the online 
expressive environment, some have proposed the further maximalist 
move of directly applying the First Amendment to these companies (or, 
more modestly, to certain uses of their digital platforms by government 
officials).188 The resurrection and expansion of Marsh v. Alabama,189 a 
1946 case in which the Court treated a “company town” as a state actor 
for First Amendment purposes, is an idée fixe of this literature.190 Yet 
while these proposals are often motivated by a concern about the 
amount of power that a small number of technology firms wield, it is far 
from clear that their adoption would serve egalitarian ends. As Balkin 
explains, to hold Facebook, Google, and their ilk to the same First 
Amendment standards to which we hold public regulators “would quickly 
make these spaces far less valuable to end users, if not wholly 
ungovernable,” and would significantly impair the firms’ ability to tamp 
down on hate speech, harassment, and other forms of antisocial 
                                                                                                                           
appear to seek heightened judicial solicitude for the expressive conduct of poor or 
otherwise disempowered speakers. The history of First Amendment Lochnerism suggests 
the difficulty of convincing courts to recognize any such carve-in and then stabilizing it 
across judicial appointments and political economic change. Even if this could be 
achieved, however, the result may be hard to reconcile with the principles of content and 
viewpoint neutrality, at least as those principles have been articulated in modern doctrine. 
See supra notes 147–153 and accompanying text; infra notes 213–217 and accompanying 
text. The strategic question facing these progressive maximalists is therefore not just 
whether they can avoid co-optation and drift, but whether arguments of this sort can be 
pursued to any substantial extent within the terms of the liberal compromise—or whether 
their success depends, instead, on a reorientation of First Amendment law toward the 
pursuit of substantively egalitarian governance. 
 187. See Klonick, supra note 97, at 1609–13 (summarizing First Amendment state 
action doctrine). 
 188. See generally Whitney, supra note 96, at 24–28 (reviewing recent lawsuits raising 
such claims and concluding that “the once off-the-wall theory that these companies should 
count as state actors for First Amendment purposes is starting to look a bit more on the 
table”). 
 189. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 190. See, e.g., Jonathan Peters, The “Sovereigns of Cyberspace” and State Action: The 
First Amendment’s Application—or Lack Thereof—to Third-Party Platforms, 32 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 989, 1025 (2017) (using “Marsh as a foundation” for “a state action theory 
suitable for the digital world”); Daniel Rudofsky, Note, Modern State Action Doctrine in 
the Age of Big Data, 71 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 741, 777 (2017) (“Facebook is the town in 
Marsh v. Alabama. Only it appears to be a virtual town, and Facebook has essentially 
created a government over that virtual town. A strong case could be made that Facebook 
should be considered a state actor . . . .”). 
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expression that disproportionately target women and racial minorities.191 
First Amendment doctrine would have to be made much more internally 
proregulatory before its direct application to these platforms could 
become a net plus for egalitarians. 
B. Speech on Both Sides 
First Amendment minimalist and maximalist arguments confine 
themselves to the traditional image of Anglo-American public law 
adjudication, pitting private right against public authority in a politically 
independent court of law.192 Their underlying premise is that egalitarian 
ends can be achieved by recalibrating the distribution of constitutional 
authority between a private party’s expressive interests and the state’s 
legitimate public interests—interests ranging from social welfare to 
national security to antidiscrimination. In any given case, minimalist 
arguments tend to value the state’s public interests more highly than the 
private party’s expressive interests, and accordingly call for narrower First 
Amendment coverage or weaker First Amendment protection of the 
latter. Conversely, maximalist arguments tend to value certain expressive 
interests more highly than the state’s public interests, and accordingly 
call for broader First Amendment coverage or stronger First Amendment 
protection of the former. 
A second genre of egalitarian argument complicates this framework 
by introducing a set of interests that neither the private litigant nor the 
state necessarily represents. These interests are the expressive interests of 
third parties. Whereas minimalist and maximalist arguments focus on the 
degree to which the First Amendment should shield a particular party’s 
expressive activity from state interference, arguments involving speech on 
both sides focus on the degree to which one party’s expressive activity 
compromises the ability of other private parties to exercise their own 
First Amendment rights. 
The generic speech-on-both-sides argument begins by identifying 
expressive interests distinct from, and downstream of, the expressive 
interests asserted by Speaker X in a First Amendment challenge to state 
regulation. The next two steps of the argument are to claim, first, that in 
the absence of appropriate regulation, the expression of X threatens the 
expressive interests of Speakers Y and Z, for example by “chilling” or 
“drowning out” the speech of Y and Z; and next, that these threatened 
interests are themselves entitled to some degree of First Amendment 
solicitude. The final step of the speech-on-both-sides argument is to 
contend that, when adjudicating X’s constitutional claim, courts should 
                                                                                                                           
 191. Balkin, Triangle, supra note 159, at 2026. 
 192. See generally Peter L. Lindseth, Reconciling with the Past: John Willis and the 
Question of Judicial Review in Inter-War and Post-War England, 55 U. Toronto L.J. 657, 
663–76 (2005) (describing the origins and persistence of this traditional image in English 
public law). 
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take into account the threat that X’s expression poses to the expressive 
interests of Y and Z. This might lead a court to devalue speech by X that 
tends to silence Y and Z—to accord X’s speech less First Amendment 
protection than it might otherwise enjoy.193 Alternatively, judicial 
consideration of the immanent conflict between the expressive freedom 
of X and the expressive freedoms of Y and Z might lead a court to accord 
greater weight to the state’s public interests in regulating X. Those public 
interests would now include preservation of the First Amendment rights 
of Y and Z.194 
Whatever the precise form that it takes, the egalitarian goal of the 
speech-on-both-sides approach is to promote the positive liberty of those 
disempowered speakers who find it difficult to vindicate their expressive 
interests as First Amendment plaintiffs. Such speakers may suffer legally 
not only from a comparative lack of financial or cultural capital, but also 
from the adversarial, state-versus-society character of public law litigation. 
Judicial enforcement of the First Amendment focuses on private parties 
with grievances against the state for interfering with (rather than for 
failing to enable) their expression.195 Speech-on-both-sides arguments 
seek to ameliorate this structural bias by opening the courthouse 
windows, so that the struggle for expressive freedom within society can 
be heard in the midst of adjudications formally framed as struggles 
between regulated speakers and their regulators. 
Described in this way, speech-on-both-sides arguments have an impres-
sive, if controversial, pedigree within contemporary First Amendment 
                                                                                                                           
 193. When the speech-on-both-sides argument takes this form, it can also be described 
as a minimalist move insofar as it entails decreasing First Amendment coverage or 
protection for a particular kind of speech. 
 194. Whether or not this should be understood as a maximalist move is a tricky 
question. On the one hand, recognizing a strong public interest in preserving the ability of 
third parties to exercise their First Amendment rights does amount to greater protection 
of those rights. But as a matter of legal form, it is the state’s authority to restrict speech—
speech that suppresses too much other speech—that has been enhanced. Such regulation 
of third-party harms would seem to have a surer constitutional footing in the religious 
liberty context due to the interplay between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 
which forbid accommodations of religion that impose significant burdens on the religious 
liberty of others. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA 
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of 
Religion, 49 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 343, 356–71 (2014) (reviewing this constitutional 
argument). But cf. Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 Va. L. 
Rev. 317, 359–71 (2011) (noting the absence of an Establishment Clause for speech but 
suggesting that the Supreme Court’s compelled speech doctrine might provide a usable 
alternative). 
 195. See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” 
First Amendment, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1939, 1943 (2003) (“The present Court, across 
the terrain of First Amendment doctrine, treats the freedom of expression and the 
attendant freedom of association as private, negative rights intended to shield individual 
autonomy against government regulation.”). 
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theory.196 Speech-on-both-sides arguments have featured prominently, for 
instance, in egalitarian defenses of regulations of pornography on the 
ground that pornography silences women and suffocates antipatriarchal 
speech;197 in egalitarian defenses of regulations of campaign spending on 
the ground that unlimited spending by wealthy interests impedes “the 
kind of open public political discussion that the First Amendment seeks 
to sustain”;198 and in egalitarian defenses of (and proposals to expand) 
copyright law doctrines such as fair use on the ground that overly broad 
copyright protections jeopardize the free speech rights of third parties.199 
                                                                                                                           
 196. Speech-on-both-sides arguments are a subset of what Eugene Volokh calls the 
“constitutional tension” method, which asks why any given speaker’s free speech rights 
should necessarily trump other constitutional values, including equality interests and the 
free speech interests of third parties. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 223 (1996). 
According to Volokh, although a constitutional tension approach to the First Amendment 
“comes naturally” and can be traced “to the founding of our nation,” it has an 
“unfortunate” track record and is “not the approach the Supreme Court generally uses 
today.” Id. at 224–25; see also Erica Goldberg, Competing Speech Values in an Age of 
Protest, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 2163, 2167–68 (2018) (concluding similarly that under current 
doctrine “the government generally cannot advance the desire to promote free speech 
values . . . as an interest in restricting a private party’s free speech rights”). 
 197. Major works in this genre include Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing 
Women (1981); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only Words (1993) [hereinafter MacKinnon, 
Only Words]; Alisa L. Carse, Pornography: An Uncivil Liberty?, 10 Hypatia 155 (1995); 
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 345 (2014); and Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 Phil. & Pub. 
Aff. 293 (1993). For a succinct summary of Professor Catharine MacKinnon’s and Andrea 
Dworkin’s canonical speech-on-both-sides arguments, see Balkin, Some Realism, supra note 
81, at 377–78. For MacKinnon’s most recent critique of First Amendment pornography 
doctrine, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, The First Amendment: An Equality Reading, in 
The Free Speech Century (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., forthcoming 2018) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 198. Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 47 
(2005); see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 441 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “the Constitution does, in fact, 
permit numerous ‘restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a few from 
drowning out the many’” (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., concurring))); id. at 470 (“[W]hen corporations grab up the prime broadcasting 
slots on the eve of an election, they can flood the market with advocacy that bears ‘little or 
no correlation’ to the ideas of natural persons or to any broader notion of the public 
good.” (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))); 
cf. Bradley A. Smith, The John Roberts Salvage Company: After McConnell, a New Court 
Looks to Repair the Constitution, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 891, 909 (2007) (“[I]t has long been a 
fundamental part of the ‘drowning out’ argument popular in [campaign finance] ‘reform’ 
circles that some doors of communication must of necessity be closed in order to open 
others.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as a “free 
speech safeguard[]”); Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 
31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1781, 1793–95 (2010) (summarizing judicial and scholarly arguments 
that fair-use expression should receive First Amendment protection); see also Rebecca 
Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with 
Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 
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Speech-on-both-sides arguments have also made cameos in recent 
scholarship defending restrictions on employers’ anti-union speech as a 
safeguard of employee expression and association.200 “Behind almost 
every restriction on speech,” Professor Erica Goldberg observes in a new 
article cataloguing additional examples, “lurks a potential argument that 
the lack of a speech regulation may be as deleterious to free speech 
values as a proposed speech regulation.”201 
The paradigm case of speech-on-both-sides argument concerns hate 
speech202—speech that vilifies, denigrates, or dehumanizes individuals or 
groups on the basis of ascriptive characteristics “such as race, ethnicity, 
religion, gender, or sexual orientation.”203 The traditional legal term for 
such speech is group defamation or group libel, and these categories still 
animate hate speech jurisprudence across the globe. In the United 
States, however, hate speech regulations have fallen out of favor in 
response to a growing judicial consensus that they violate the First 
Amendment.204 Existing First Amendment doctrine does permit the 
                                                                                                                           
42 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 67 (2000) (using copyright law to illuminate the general First Amendment 
problem raised “[w]hen speech interests exist on both sides of an issue”). 
 200. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, Labor Values Are First Amendment Values: Why 
Union Comprehensive Campaigns Are Protected Speech, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2617, 2660 
(2011) (arguing that although federal regulation of employers’ speech during 
unionization campaigns “involves restrictions on speech,” these restrictions are justified in 
part because they enhance “employees’ First Amendment associational interests”); 
Andrias, Robust Public Debate, supra note 150, at 2432 (arguing for a reframing of “the 
free speech paradigm within workplace representation elections as Speech vs. Speech”). 
 201. Goldberg, supra note 196, at 2165. Goldberg herself is wary of speech-on-both-
sides arguments and urges “a formally neutral free speech doctrine” that discounts them, 
as “governmental intervention into speech is,” in her view, “far more corrosive than any 
private interference or self-censorship.” Id. at 2168. 
 202. Cf. Volokh, supra note 196, at 224 (suggesting that the “constitutional tension” 
approach to the First Amendment has been most fully theorized “with regard to the hate 
speech debate”). 
 203. Craig Martin, Striking the Right Balance: Hate Speech Laws in Japan, the United 
States, and Canada, 45 Hastings Const. L.Q. 455, 455 (2018); see also Alexander Brown, 
Retheorizing Actionable Injuries in Civil Lawsuits Involving Targeted Hate Speech: Hate 
Speech as Degradation and Humiliation, 9 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2018) (defining the 
“opaque idiom” of hate speech in terms of “vituperation (bitter and abusive language) or 
vilification (viciously disparaging or insulting language) that makes reference to the victim’s 
race, ethnicity, nationality, citizenship status, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
disability, or other protected characteristic”). 
 204. While the Supreme Court’s decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 
(1952), which upheld a state criminal law prohibiting group defamation, has never been 
overturned, its validity has been all but ignored for at least four decades. See, e.g., Collin v. 
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978) (questioning whether Beauharnais “would pass 
constitutional muster today”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). For the development of 
the American status quo and its position as a global outlier, see Jeremy Waldron, Dignity 
and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1596, 1601–02 (2010). For three 
foundational efforts to revive the American law of group libel and defamation with respect 
to racist speech, see generally Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for 
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Charles 
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prohibition of speech used to commit a criminal or civil infraction, as 
long as the infraction is not itself defined in terms of the expression of a 
particular topic or viewpoint.205 It also permits the prohibition of speech 
that, in a given context, is so inflammatory as to have the force and effect 
of otherwise sanctionable physical conduct.206 But typical hate speech laws 
do not fit well into either of these categories: They do define infractions 
in terms of the expression of a particular message, and they self-
consciously do not confine their sanctions to speech that causes immediate 
physical disruption. On the contrary, the harms that hate speech laws 
would most specifically redress are often those that implicate psychologi-
cal, dignitary, and expressive interests. 
Proponents of such laws have long argued that one of the most 
significant costs of hate speech is its tendency to suppress the expressive 
and associational activity of vilified individuals and groups.207 As Professor 
Mari Matsuda writes: “In order to avoid receiving hate messages, victims 
have had to quit jobs, forgo education, leave their homes, avoid certain 
public places, curtail their own exercise of speech rights, and otherwise 
modify their behavior and demeanor.”208 Not only can hate speech 
silence individuals in the short term, but both hate speech and the 
failure to police it can also lead to the longer-term “disassociation” of 
minority groups from the ostensibly democratic political community and 
the communicative action essential to its maintenance.209 It is for this 
                                                                                                                           
R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 
Duke L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim’s Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989). 
 205. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383–91 (1992) (distinguishing a 
narrow yet constitutionally impermissible hate speech law from those categories of speech 
that the government may constitutionally prohibit); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 
S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (confirming the vitality of R.A.V.’s approach); id. at 2235 (Breyer, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (same); id. at 2237–38 (Kagan, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (same). 
 206. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (indicating that while the 
First Amendment generally protects speech that advocates violence, it allows prohibitions 
on advocacy that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely 
to incite or produce such action”). 
 207. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 203, at 504 (“[H]ate speech . . . not only distorts the 
search for truth, but suppress[es] and silence[s] the voices of the members of the target 
minority. Members of the hated group are effectively muzzled and driven from the public 
arena and fora of debate . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 467 n.38, 502 n.174 
(collecting sources making similar arguments). 
 208. Matsuda, supra note 204, at 2337; see also Brown, supra note 203, at 18–22 
(arguing that hate speech makes it more difficult for its targets to communicate in an 
effective and self-controlled manner); Delgado, supra note 204, at 146–47 (calling atten-
tion to public schools as a key institution in which the censorious dynamics of hate speech 
may be particularly acute and destructive). 
 209. Matsuda, supra note 204, at 2337–38. For the canonical “communicative” account 
of democratic society, see 1 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: 
Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) 
(1981). In this spirit, Professor Richard Delgado has suggested that the legal sanctioning 
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reason that legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron views hate speech 
regulation as supporting the public good of “assurance,” or “conveying 
to people a sense of security in the enjoyment of their most fundamental 
rights.”210 Beyond its immediate targets, hate speech may also impose 
expressive and associational costs on “non-target-group members,” costs 
that may be of “constitutional dimension” insofar as they fracture or 
stultify democratic dialogue.211 More recently, the power of hate speech 
to drive vulnerable individuals and groups from the public square seems 
to have been magnified by the rise of the platform economy. The 
anonymity afforded by digital communications technologies, together 
with the speed and scale at which content spreads across the internet, 
have combined to create an “unforgiving ecology” of online abuse for 
women and other historically subordinated groups.212 
As the example of hate speech regulation shows, the failure of 
speech-on-both-sides arguments to make more headway in the courts213 
has not been for lack of theory or evidence that certain forms of speech 
can degrade various other forms of speech. That premise is not much in 
dispute. Rather, the failure of such arguments reflects both the 
substantively libertarian orientation of First Amendment doctrine and 
the arguments’ awkward fit with the structure of public law litigation—a 
structure that disinclines judges to acknowledge and balance the competing 
constitutional interests of private parties.214 Some formulations of speech-
on-both-sides arguments may also run afoul of the Court’s doctrines 
regarding content and viewpoint neutrality, which strongly disfavor laws 
that appear on their face to prefer one sort of speech over another (say, 
nonhateful speech over hateful speech). These doctrines, as Lakier explains 
in her essay for this Symposium, have come to embody a formalistic 
conception of “expressive equality” that “limit[s] the effectiveness of the 
                                                                                                                           
of hate speech may be necessary precisely because such speech interrupts the normal 
functioning of democratic dialogue that might otherwise correct it. See Delgado, supra 
note 204, at 147. 
 210. Waldron, supra note 204, at 1626–30. Only thanks to the provision of such 
assurance, Waldron contends, can “people who might otherwise feel insecure, unwanted, 
or despised . . . put that insecurity out of their minds and concentrate on what matters to 
them in social interaction—its pleasures and opportunities.” Id. at 1629. 
 211. Matsuda, supra note 204, at 2338–39. 
 212. Sylvain, supra note 99, at 9; see also id. at 10 (discussing Professor Danielle 
Citron’s and Professor Mary Anne Franks’s pioneering work on this issue). As Citron 
explained nearly a decade ago, the internet enables “bigots” to form “anonymous online 
mobs” and engage in numerous communicative activities that “terrorize victims, destroy 
reputations, corrode privacy, and impair victims’ ability to participate in online and offline 
society as equals.” Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 61, 63–64 (2009). 
 213. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 214. For a broad comparative critique of U.S. courts’ efforts to avoid the explicit 
balancing of rights claims, see generally Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—
Foreword: Rights as Trumps, 132 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
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First Amendment as a tool for protecting the expressive freedom of those 
at the bottom of the economic and social hierarchies.”215 According to 
these doctrines, the important thing is not that everyone’s speech interests 
are recognized and respected; the important thing is that every person, 
natural and artificial, is subject to the same governmental speech rules. 
Lakier herself embraces the proposition that the First Amendment 
contains a principle of expressive equality, but she observes, crucially, 
that the meaning of expressive equality may be construed in a more or 
less context-sensitive manner. This observation echoes the classic debate 
between anticlassification and antisubordination readings of the Equal 
Protection Clause.216 Speech-on-both-sides arguments tend to be deeply 
concerned with the expressive environment’s egalitarian character, only 
they conceptualize equality in more functionalist, materialist, and 
dignitarian terms than is typical in First Amendment law.217 From this 
perspective, expressive equality is not about treating all speakers the 
same. It is about ensuring that all speakers have a more or less equal 
opportunity to participate in the public sphere. Lakier’s essay can be 
read as a call for a kind of symmetry across the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments: Legal liberals who support an antisubordination approach 
to equal protection, she suggests, should want judges to incorporate 
antisubordination norms into free speech law as well. One way judges 
might do this is by giving closer consideration to the expressive interests 
of third parties when those interests are directly implicated by the First 
Amendment case at hand. 
C. From Speaker to System 
Speech-on-both-sides arguments aspire to make First Amendment 
law more egalitarian, and less Lochnerian, by acknowledging a wider 
range of expressive interests. Compared to the standard method of First 
Amendment analysis, these arguments take a relatively broad and 
dynamic view as to which speakers matter and which forms of 
interference with their speech raise constitutional concerns—looking not 
only at speakers whose expression is constrained by state regulation but 
                                                                                                                           
 215. Lakier, supra note 141, at 2127. 
 216. See id. at 2121–23. For a precursor to Lakier’s proposed hybridization of free speech 
and equal protection, see Charles R. Lawrence III, Cross Burning and the Sound of 
Silence: Anti-Subordination Theory and the First Amendment, in The Price We Pay: The 
Case Against Racist Speech, Hate Propaganda, and Pornography 114 (Laura J. Lederer & 
Richard Delgado eds., 1995) (discussing the relationship between antisubordination con-
structions of the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment). For a more general 
discussion of “hybrid” and “intersectional” constitutional rights, see Kerry Abrams & Brandon 
L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1309 (2017). 
 217. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Only Words, supra note 197, at 98 (contrasting American 
free speech law’s “stupid theory of equality,” which is “indifferent to whether dominant or 
subordinated groups are hurt or helped,” with the “more substantive” Canadian approach, 
which is “directed toward changing unequal social relations”). 
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also at third parties whose expression may be liberated by such 
regulation. Yet once one begins to move away from the dyadic, speaker-
versus-regulator focus of current doctrine, why stop there? Why limit the 
analysis to the claims of competing speakers, rather than ask which sorts 
of regulation would best serve the expressive environment as a whole? A 
final set of egalitarian strategies resists the lure of the vexing individual 
case and emphasizes instead the importance of examining the system of 
free expression at the macro level—attending to the perspective of 
listeners as well as speakers, and taking into account the informational 
and expressive interests of as many listeners and speakers as practicable. 
The First Amendment literature in support of campaign finance 
regulation illustrates how easily speech-on-both-sides arguments can 
bleed into systemic arguments of this sort. As noted above, liberal jurists 
such as Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice Stevens, and Judge Wright have 
sought to sustain statutory limits on electioneering expenditures against 
First Amendment attack partly on the ground that such limits may 
“enhance[] the self-expression of individual citizens who lack wealth.”218 
While this argument works in part by identifying the “speech on both 
sides” of campaign finance laws, it does so with reference to a practically 
uncountable number of nonwealthy third-party speakers. Furthermore, 
these jurists pivot almost immediately to a broader set of claims about 
how expenditure limits may also enhance “the truth-producing capacity 
of the marketplace of ideas”219 and “the integrity, competitiveness, and 
democratic responsiveness of the electoral process.”220 If anything, the 
standard legal-liberal defense of the constitutionality of campaign 
finance regulation places greater weight on the interests of listener-voters 
than it does on the interests of speaker-campaigners. The fundamental 
concern is not that big-money spending will result in the suppression of 
ordinary people’s political speech (a difficult-to-prove empirical 
proposition). The fundamental concern is that such spending will skew 
political discourse, and politics itself, in antidemocratic ways. 
Speech-on-both-sides arguments, it turns out, cannot easily be 
confined to the courthouse. Their proponents want judges to give 
greater weight to the expressive, informational, and dignitarian interests 
of third parties who may be negatively affected by a litigant’s First 
Amendment victory and therefore to uphold regulations designed to 
protect those interests. At least in principle, however, there is little reason 
why someone advocating this approach should not also want judges to 
give greater weight to the interests of speakers and listeners one step 
                                                                                                                           
 218. Wright, supra note 145, at 637; see also supra notes 143–145, 198 and 
accompanying text. 
 219. Wright, supra note 145, at 636. 
 220. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 472 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); see also Breyer, supra note 198, at 47 (“Ultimately, [campaign 
finance laws] seek . . . to maintain the integrity of the political process—a process that 
itself translates political speech into governmental action.”). 
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further removed from any given case.221 More than that, there is little 
reason why someone who supports judicially enforced redistribution of 
speech rights in the name of the First Amendment should not also want 
legislative and executive officials to pursue policies that advance the 
expressive, informational, and dignitarian interests of the polity. 
Compared to courts, legislatures and agencies are likely to be in a better 
position to advance such interests at a wholesale level. 
Several strains of anti-Lochnerian First Amendment argument make 
just this move from speaker to system—from asking how to define and 
defend specific types of speech by specific types of persons to asking how 
to engineer a fairer, fuller, “freer” expressive environment for everyone. 
Some systemic arguments remain fairly far off the wall, such as those that 
militate for a First Amendment right to an adequate education222 or to “a 
formal, transparent platform for individual—and, in particular, 
minority—voices to participate in the lawmaking process.”223 Systemic 
arguments in favor of campaign finance regulation are comparatively 
mainstream. Outside of the campaign finance context, the systemic 
perspective has proven especially popular in the First Amendment 
literature on media regulation in its widest sense, what Marvin Ammori 
has called the “structure of American communication.”224 Ammori’s 
                                                                                                                           
 221. Notice in this regard that speech-on-both-sides arguments implicitly acknowledge 
listeners’ interests. The claim that certain forms of expression on one “side” 
(pornography, hate speech, big-money campaign spending) are liable to undermine 
expression on the other “side” (speech by women, vulnerable minorities, the nonwealthy) 
depends upon the effects that the former is expected to have on listeners (chilling, 
scaring, silencing). The basic concern is that unregulated or misregulated expression at T1 
will prevent listeners at T2 from becoming speakers themselves at T3. Even if speech-on-
both-sides arguments do not invoke listeners’ interests as such, they tend to assume a 
certain causal relationship between the experience of listening and the production of 
speech. 
 222. See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education 
Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 550, 596–602 (1992); Penelope A. Preovolos, Rodriguez Revisited: 
Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 Santa Clara L. 
Rev. 75, 91–96 (1980); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 
(1973) (noting the appellees’ contention “that education is itself a fundamental personal 
right because it is essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to 
intelligent utilization of the right to vote”). 
 223. Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1131, 1131 
(2016). Drawing on a range of historical and political science sources, McKinley’s 
innovative article suggests that the Petition Clause might be revived to challenge the 
current system of congressional lobbying and the preferential access this system affords to 
the politically powerful. 
 224. Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 10. The 
concept of a “structure of communication” usefully complements two other, better 
established concepts in twentieth-century social theory: “structure of power” and 
“structure of feeling.” On the former, see William F. Grover & Joseph G. Peschek, The 
Unsustainable Presidency: Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Beyond 15 (2014) (“There is a 
structure of power—‘the very structure and operation of society itself’—that lies 
beneath the distribution of governmental powers.” (quoting Woodrow Wilson, The New 
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portrayal of this structure relies heavily on physical metaphor, charting a 
landscape of “speech spaces” and the legal “architecture” that shapes 
them.225 But the broader import of his doctrinal and scholarly overview is 
more abstract: A venerable tradition of constitutional theorists has found 
the First Amendment to permit or even require the state to take 
affirmative steps to secure the expressive and informational interests of 
“all Americans,”226 population by population and medium by medium, 
from internet to television to telephone to print publishing to city 
streets.227 
As Ammori emphasizes, his “architectural” approach builds on the 
work of leading First Amendment theorists of media regulation, 
including Professors C. Edwin Baker, Jack Balkin, Jerome Barron, Yochai 
Benkler, Owen Fiss, and Cass Sunstein.228 All of these theorists share a 
commitment to affirmative government intervention across a range of 
media, whether through financial subsidies for the press, a “fairness 
doctrine” requiring broadcasters to present opposing views on a contro-
versial issue, “must-carry” rules for cable providers,229 “net neutrality” and 
“open access” rules for internet carriers,230 or any number of other 
regulatory strategies aimed at creating a more democratic and egalitarian 
                                                                                                                           
Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People 19 
(1961))); C. Wright Mills, The Structure of Power in American Society, 9 Brit. J. Soc. 29, 
32–35 (1958) (describing a “structure of power” as a network of public and private 
institutions that determine the real experience of being governed in a given society). On 
the latter, see Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature 131–35 (1977) (describing a 
“structure of feeling” as the less-than-conscious attitudes and habits that members of a 
given society develop in response to the formal discourses and institutions that constitute 
the society’s self-conscious communal life). By analogy, a structure of communication 
might be understood as the real experience of speaking and listening in a given polity, as 
determined by the interaction of the social, economic, and technological means of 
communication and the legal and political governance of those means. Cf. Ammori, supra, 
at 21 (describing the practices and principles that “have been core to how Americans 
experience their First Amendment protections” (emphasis added)). All three of these 
concepts of structure play important roles, whether explicitly or implicitly, in systemic First 
Amendment argument. 
 225. Ammori, supra note 224, passim. 
 226. Id. at 21. 
 227. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
933, 936 (2008) (cataloging a historical range of “speech conduits,” from “dead tree” 
newspapers to “wireless services”). 
 228. See Ammori, supra note 224, at 10, 18, 24 (noting these influences). 
 229. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, A New Deal for Speech, 17 Hastings Comm. & Ent. 
L.J. 137, 138–40, 154–59 (1994) (suggesting each of the foregoing strategies, among 
others, as potential means “to promote freedom of speech” by “promot[ing] attention to 
public issues and diversity of view” and thereby “diminish[ing] the influence of money 
over the content of broadcasting”). 
 230. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 Pepp. 
L. Rev. 427, 428–33 (2009) [hereinafter Balkin, Future of Free Expression] (net 
neutrality); Yochai Benkler, Ending the Internet’s Trench Warfare, N.Y. Times (Mar. 20, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/opinion/21Benkler.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (open access). 
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structure of communication. In this spirit, Professor Tim Wu has recently 
proposed “[n]ew laws or regulations requiring that major speech 
platforms behave as public trustees, with general duties to police fake 
users, remove propaganda robots, and promote a robust speech 
environment surrounding matters of public concern.”231 
However exactly they are framed, these proposals reflect a 
conviction that a well-functioning “system of free speech depends not 
only on the mere absence of state censorship, but also on an 
infrastructure of free expression.”232 The Constitution must not stand in 
the way of building this infrastructure; on the contrary, it may need to be 
recruited as an ally in the effort. “When the state acts to enhance the 
quality of public debate,” Fiss writes in a representative passage, “we 
should recognize its actions as consistent with the First Amendment.”233 
“What is more, when on occasions it fails to, we can with confidence 
demand that the state so act.”234 
Brought together by these basic commitments, egalitarian theorists 
of the “system of free speech” nevertheless vary in their normative and 
institutional emphases. For instance, some systemic theorists seek to 
establish a constitutional pedigree for their policy prescriptions, insisting 
that the First Amendment itself demands or at least motivates their 
proposals. Most others, however, ground their prescriptions in the 
subconstitutional or extraconstitutional demands of democracy, social 
justice, or prudence, seeking to establish only that the First Amendment 
does not forbid them.235 Likewise, some systemic theorists foreground the 
                                                                                                                           
 231. Wu, Obsolete, supra note 158, at 23. These measures are needed, in Wu’s view, to 
counter the rise of “troll armies,” “flooding” tactics, “fake news,” and other new or 
intensifying threats to the digital speech environment. Id. at 11–17, 23–26. 
 232. Balkin, Future of Free Expression, supra note 230, at 432. As Balkin elaborated 
this claim in an influential early effort to reimagine the systemic perspective for the 
internet era: 
Protecting freedom of speech in the digital age means promoting a 
core set of values in legislation, administrative regulation, and the design 
of technology. What are those values? They are interactivity, broad 
popular participation, equality of access to information and 
communications technology, promotion of democratic control in 
technological design, and the practical ability of ordinary people to 
route around, glom on, and transform. 
Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 96, at 52. 
 233. Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 125, at 1416.  
 234. Id.; see also Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 783 (1987) 
(suggesting that state regulation of speech with the goal of “furthering free speech 
values . . . is consistent with, and may even be required by, the [F]irst [A]mendment”); 
Christopher Witteman, Information Freedom, a Constitutional Value for the 21st Century, 
36 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 145, 245 (2013) (drawing on German constitutional 
jurisprudence in suggesting that the First Amendment be read to require public “access to 
a diversity of ideas and a fullness of information”). 
 235. Compare, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment 
Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1641 (1967) (arguing for “a twentieth century interpretation 
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expressive interests of marginalized speakers, whereas most others 
appear to prioritize the informational interests of listeners.236 And some 
systemic theorists envision a key role for the courts in developing robust 
speech architectures, whereas most others downplay the judicial function 
and focus on the incentives, responsibilities, and authorities that do or 
should lead legislators and administrators to enact their preferred 
reforms.237 In the language of this Essay,238 systemic theorists of the First 
Amendment tend to be more minimalist than maximalist in their visions 
of judicial review, asking the courts largely to step aside as the political 
branches experiment with measures to enhance the quality, diversity, and 
accessibility of public debate. 
As explained above, the position that the political branches, and 
only the political branches, should aggressively promote egalitarian First 
Amendment rights fell into disrepute when the liberal compromise 
supplanted progressive civil libertarianism in the mid-twentieth 
                                                                                                                           
of the [F]irst [A]mendment which will impose an affirmative responsibility on the 
monopoly newspaper to act as sounding board for new ideas and old grievances”), and 
Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 125, at 1411 (“What the phrase ‘the freedom of speech’ 
in the [F]irst [A]mendment refers to is a social state of affairs, not the action of an 
individual or institution.”), with Balkin, Future of Free Expression, supra note 230, at 441 
(“Protecting free speech values in the digital age will be less and less a problem of 
constitutional law . . . and more and more a problem of technology and administrative 
regulation.”), and Wu, Obsolete, supra note 158, at 19 (affirming the “basic” proposition 
that the First Amendment is “a negative right against coercive government action,” not “a 
right against the conduct of nongovernmental actors” or “a right that obliges the 
government to ensure a pristine speech environment”). 
 236. Compare, e.g., Barron, supra note 235, at 1678 (proposing “a right to be heard” 
that would allow more speakers to obtain access to the mass media), with C. Edwin 
Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 839, 854 (2002) 
(criticizing a shift in First Amendment doctrine from treating media entities 
“instrumentally,” and protecting their speech choices only insofar as they “serve the 
interests of the audience in the receipt of uncensored and diverse content,” toward 
“treating media enterprises as rights bearers in their own behalf”), and Fiss, Social 
Structure, supra note 125, at 1411 (“[T]he key to fulfilling the ultimate purposes of the 
[F]irst [A]mendment is not [speaker] autonomy . . . . In fact, autonomy adds nothing and 
if need be, might have to be sacrificed, to make certain that public debate is sufficiently 
rich to permit true collective self-determination.”). 
 237. Compare, e.g., Ammori, supra note 224, at 21 (identifying five doctrinal 
“principles” that “reflect a substantive, value-laden concern for the availability of speech 
spaces for all Americans” and arguing that these principles “should be adopted explicitly 
by courts deciding questions concerning legislated or judicial access to speech spaces”), 
and Barron, supra note 235, at 1678 (urging “the courts to fashion a remedy for a right of 
access, at least in the most arbitrary cases, independently of legislation”), with C. Edwin 
Baker, Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
733, 755–58 (2005) (criticizing “activist judicial review” of “media architecture” regulation 
and noting that “the market is merely one among many possible architectures”), and Cass 
R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255, 257 (1992) (criticizing judicial 
interpretations of the First Amendment that “invalidate democratic efforts to promote the 
principle of popular sovereignty”). 
 238. See supra section IV.A. 
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century.239 Few if any of today’s systemic theorists openly repudiate the 
resulting constitutional settlement. Even as he urges state intervention to 
enhance public debate, for example, Fiss is careful to clarify that 
“[j]udges are the ultimate guardians of constitutional values” and bear a 
heavy “burden of guarding against the danger of First Amendment 
counterproductivity.”240 Yet by placing so much stock in legislative and 
administrative action and so little stock in judicial protection of negative 
rights against government infringement of speech, some of the stronger 
versions of the move from speaker to system may have quite disruptive 
implications. Indeed, the very aspiration to engineer a “better” system of 
free expression through the political process represents a challenge to 
the prevailing “negative-liberty model” of the First Amendment and its 
premise that “the central First Amendment purpose . . . is to keep 
government out of speech.”241 As Professor Burt Neuborne has observed, 
“[c]urrent Supreme Court doctrine is relentlessly speaker-centered” and 
inattentive to the interests of “the hearer,”242 much less to the interests of 
the expressive environment writ large. This state of affairs is partly 
attributable to the structure of First Amendment litigation and partly to 
the Court’s “uncompromising refusal to trust government speech 
regulators with any significant power.”243 
In short, to ask judges to review free speech cases through a systemic 
lens, or otherwise to defer to legislative and administrative judgments 
about the speech system, is to imagine a very different First Amendment 
regime from the one we have now. Insofar as the logic of egalitarian 
critique pushes toward a systemic perspective, the question therefore 
arises whether First Amendment Lochnerism could ever truly be 
dispelled without a radical rethinking of existing doctrine, including the 
limits imposed by the liberal compromise. The move from speaker to 
system is the most powerful move in the contemporary grammar of 
egalitarian First Amendment argument; its underlying account of free 
speech does not merely complicate or chisel away at the deregulatory 
Lochnerian paradigm but supplies a comprehensive alternative. It does 
so, however, by putting pressure on First Amendment norms ranging 
from content and viewpoint neutrality to the primacy of judicial 
enforcement to the baseline opposition to redistribution of expressive 
and informational resources. In threatening to displace such norms, the 
pursuit of systemic egalitarianism may end up looking a good deal like a 
revival of progressive civil libertarianism. 
                                                                                                                           
 239. See supra notes 147–155 and accompanying text; supra section I.B. 
 240. Fiss, Social Structure, supra note 125, at 1420. 
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CONCLUSION: THE EGALITARIAN FIRST AMENDMENT IN EXILE? 
The search for an egalitarian First Amendment has never looked 
harder. As this Essay has tried to show, it is not just the current composi-
tion of the Supreme Court or its most controversial free speech decisions 
that account for the rise of First Amendment Lochnerism—a First 
Amendment jurisprudence that disables redistributive regulation and 
exacerbates socioeconomic inequality. Beyond the recent upsurge in con-
servative judicial appointees, a series of more fundamental developments 
in American law and political economy has facilitated, and seems likely to 
continue to facilitate, the spread of First Amendment Lochnerism. Three 
in particular stand out: first, the long-term growth of numerous over-
lapping forms of inequality from the 1970s through the present;244 
second, the rise of informational capitalism in the marketplace and a 
First Amendment–industrial complex in civil society;245 and third, the 
surprising degree to which the midcentury liberal compromise between 
progressive and reactionary understandings of the First Amendment has 
delegitimated efforts to redistribute expressive and informational 
resources while legitimating an increasingly inegalitarian socioeconomic 
structure.246 
In terms of both knowledge and power, legal egalitarians are best 
equipped to interrogate and to challenge the third development: the 
tendency of the liberal compromise, and the presumptively benign First 
Amendment jurisprudence it has produced, to favor First Amendment 
Lochnerism. Yet legal egalitarians cannot simply renounce the liberal 
compromise. Or, at least, they cannot do so without committing to a 
practically difficult and normatively fraught renovation of American 
constitutionalism writ large. This is because the features of the liberal 
compromise that allow First Amendment Lochnerism to thrive are 
intrinsic to the broader constitutional settlement that emerged from the 
New Deal. These include the primacy of judicial enforcement of civil 
libertarian rights and the reconceptualization of such rights as limita-
tions on the state’s regulatory role, irrespective of the regulated parties’ 
relative socioeconomic power. Although the renunciation of these 
features might well forestall the spread of First Amendment Lochnerism, 
it would also undermine the very constitutional settlement that legal 
egalitarians currently seek to defend from conservative attack on 
multiple fronts.247 
                                                                                                                           
 244. See supra notes 2–19 and accompanying text (surveying historical and economic 
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Faced with this conundrum, this Essay has canvassed First 
Amendment scholarship in search of ways around it, paths that may have 
gone unnoticed because theorists and historians were seeking solutions 
to a different problem. We find that traditional First Amendment 
theorizing in the grand style—a style motivated by justificatory ideals 
such as truth, autonomy, and democracy—is too empirically thin and 
politically inert to be of much use in this search.248 Elsewhere, however, 
in scholarship more focused on concrete policy matters and persistent 
doctrinal ambiguities, we identify two relatively coherent and consistent 
strategies that remain available to legal egalitarians opposed to First 
Amendment Lochnerism. These strategies parallel familiar dichotomies 
from the social sciences: voice and exit,249 reform and revolution.250 The 
first strategy (voice, reform) is to remain within the world of the liberal 
compromise and to test its institutional and doctrinal boundaries. Might 
these boundaries extend farther, or prove less fixed, than previously 
thought? Notwithstanding the current composition of the federal 
judiciary, might new territory be found along the margins where a more 
egalitarian speech environment could flourish? As discussed in Part IV, 
contemporary First Amendment scholars, including participants in this 
Symposium, have not only asked these questions but also developed a 
grammar with which to answer them—a set of midlevel doctrinal and 
empirical arguments that seek to justify special judicial solicitude for the 
expressive and informational interests of the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged. Such solicitude may take the form of either stronger or 
weaker enforcement of preexisting First Amendment principles, found 
scattered across the precedential landscape. 
This egalitarian grammar is highly suggestive of new ways to practice 
and to theorize First Amendment law. In their very generativity, however, 
the most powerful egalitarian arguments tend to move rapidly toward the 
frontier, to the edge of the liberal compromise if not beyond it 
altogether. Here we find the other means of evading First Amendment 
Lochnerism that our overview of free speech theory and historiography 
has identified. What lies beyond the liberal compromise? We suspect that 
the answer will resemble the approach that the liberal compromise itself 
displaced: the progressive civil libertarianism of the early-to-mid-twentieth 
century.251 
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This exiled alternative to the liberal compromise is in some respects 
reminiscent of the “Constitution in Exile” of the conservative legal 
imagination.252 Both the Constitution in Exile and progressive civil 
libertarianism seek to forge a new constitutional political economy—one 
that is more libertarian or egalitarian, respectively—by using civil 
libertarian argument. Both trace their origins to the far side of the New 
Deal settlement, a settlement that putatively committed the zealous 
protection of noneconomic rights to the federal judiciary while 
entrusting the rational management of economic rights to Congress and 
the executive branch. At the same time, if the conservative Constitution 
in Exile or progressive civil libertarianism were ever to return, each 
would undoubtedly look quite different from what the actual legal 
culture of the early twentieth century allowed. While progressive civil 
libertarianism does not claim an originalist pedigree, hardly anyone is a 
thoroughgoing originalist when it comes to free speech.253 Perhaps the 
most striking divide between these two exiled legal regimes is that 
progressive civil libertarianism—even in an updated and domesticated 
form—does not claim at this time any significant constituency within the 
legal academy. 
Yet as this Symposium reflects, the sheer ambition of today’s First 
Amendment Lochnerism may be creating an opening for equally 
ambitious progressive projects. For instance, mainstream legal liberals 
seem more willing to question the “negative-liberty model” of the First 
Amendment254 than they have been in decades. The ACLU is reportedly 
debating whether to reorient its free speech practice around “standing 
up for the marginalized.”255 Might the disruptive nature of the Roberts 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence generate a countervailing 
movement of real consequence? The answer to this question will depend, 
in part, on whether progressive civil libertarianism can be reimagined for 
the digital age in ways that make good on its egalitarian promise while 
limiting possibilities for government censorship and abuse. Those 
scholars and practitioners who take up this challenge will inevitably 
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disagree on many matters of normative priority and institutional detail. 
But the challenge must first be seen with clear eyes. Before any 
meaningful progress can be made toward overcoming First Amendment 
Lochnerism, its critics may need to affirm a more basic theoretical and 
practical point, a point that we hope this Essay has helped to establish: 
Progressive civil libertarianism is not a contradiction in terms. 
 
